Wireless Telecommunications, Infrastructure Security, and the NIMBY Problem
By Steven J. Eagle
This article explores the clash between federal policies encouraging wireless
communications services and the application of local land use regulations to the siting of
telecommunications towers. It concludes that Congress’s effort to strike a balance in the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 between local concerns on one hand and national commerce
and homeland security on the other has proved vague in content and susceptible to procedural
thickets that might make local parochialism impervious to challenge. The article suggests
statutory changes, including time limitations and the creation of presumptions and safe harbor
rules, that might better ba lance infrastructure development needs with local autonomy.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 (the “Act” or the “TCA”),1 was the first
comprehensive overhaul of national telecommunications policy in over 60 years, amending the
Communications Act of 1934.2 The TCA was intended to encourage low prices, the deployment
of new technologies, and growth in telecommunications, resulting from increased competition
through deregulation.3
Section 704 of the TCAprovided for a new “National Wireless Telecommunications
Siting Policy (“Section 704” or the “Siting Policy”).4 The Siting Policy is an important attempt to
harmonize local autonomy in land use regulation and national commerce. The subsequent events
of September 11, 2001 have brought into stark focus that telecommunications is a vital part of
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the Nation’s critical infrastructure for national security purposes.5 Intensifying the importance of
both the national commerce and national security issues, reliance upon wireless
telecommunications continues to grow rapidly.6
Given these important national concerns, wireless communications tower siting and
design decisions take on an importance that goes beyond the more traditional tension between
local government exercise of the police power to regulate land use and the private property rights
of landowners which are protected under the federal constitution.
Section 704 attempts, within the context of legislation facilitating wireless
communications growth, to respect the state and local authority over land use recognized by the
Supreme Court almost 80 years ago, in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.7 Indeed, the
Siting Policy is entitled “Preservation of local zoning authority.”8 I argue that this effort has
enjoyed only mixed success, and that this largely is attributable to the fact that Act reflects of
some naïve assumptions about the nature of local land use regulation.9 While regulation should
be done at the lowest appropriate level of government, there are systemic reasons why
municipalities might not perform that function well–especially when national economic
development and security are factored in. The concluding sections of this article suggests that the
TCA should be amended so as to provide the practical balance between local and national
interests that Congress might have intended.
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II. WIRELESS TELECOMMUNICATIONS – GROWTH AND DEREGULATION
A. Federal Regulation of Wireless Communications
Invoking its powers under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution,10 the federal
government has regulated wireless communications since the Radio Act of 192711 declared
governmental ownership of the radio frequency spectrum and preempted state laws that would
interfere with its use.12 The Communications Act of 1934,13 which replaced the Radio Act,
provided for the establishment of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC),14 which, in
turn, has undertaken to regulation developing communications media under a public interest
standard.15
B. Growth in Wireless Service
The Siting Policy employs the generic term “personal wireless services” (PWS) as a
descriptor for wireless telephony, including cellular phone and PCS phone service.16 Originally
employed for automobile phones in 1974, analogue systems were developed for more general
use through the mid 1980s. Thereafter, new digital phone services provided much clearer

10

U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8 (“The Congress Shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce . . . among the
several States . . . .).
11

Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-632, 44 Stat. 1162 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 119 (1927)).

12

See 47 U.S.C. § 119.

13

Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 151
(1994)).
14

See 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1994).

15

See David W. Hughes, When NIMBYs Attack: The Heights to Which Communities Will Climb to
Prevent the Siting of Wireless Towers, 23 J. CORP. L. 469, 474 (1998).
16

47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(C)(i). (“the term ‘personal wireless services’ means commercial mobile
services, unlicensed wireless services, and common carrier wireless exchange access services”).
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transmissions, with up to 20 times the number of calls that could be handled per channel.17 The
next generation of technology, Personal Communications Systems (PCS), permits both voice and
data signals to be transmitted to individuals outdoors and indoors and could replace other
services in fixed location and mobile markets. However, PCS requires more advanced
equipment. Most notably for present purposes, its higher frequency transmissions require smaller
cells18 and, therefore, a multiplicity of cell towers.19
Cellular telephone service in the United States has grown at a phenomenal rate.
According to a June 2003 FCC report, “[o]nce solely a business tool, wireless phones are now a
mass-market consumer device. The overall wireless penetration rate (defined as the number of
wireless subscribers divided by the total U.S. population) in the United States is now at 49
percent.”20
Cellular service first was licensed by the Federal Communications Commission in 1983,
and by the end of 1994, there were more than 22 million subscribers and cellular service was
available to most Americans. During the past 20 years, the number of wireless telephone
subscribers has mushroomed. Starting from a base of some 92,000 subscribers at the end of
1984, the number exceeded 1.2 million by the end of 1987. It grew to over 11 million by the end
of 1992, to over 55 million by the end of 1997, and to over 109 million by the end of 2000. By

17

See generally, Gregory Tan, Note, Wading Through the Rhetoric of the Telecommunications Act of
1996: Uncertainty of Local Zoning Authority Over Wireless Telecommunications Tower, 22 VT. L. REV.
461, 470-471 (1997) (explaining the technology of cellular systems).
18

See, id. at 471-472.

19

See Jaymes D. Littlejohn, The Impact of Land Use Regulation on Cellular Communications: Is
Federal Preemption Warranted?, 45 FED. COMM. L.J.247 (1993) (citing V. H. MacDonald, The Cellular
Concept, 58 BELL SYS. TECH. J. 15, 30 (1979)).
20

Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Annual
Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions With Respect to Commercial Mobile Services,
WT Docket No. 02-379, Eighth Report, FCC 03-150 (rel. Jul. 14, 2003), at para. 101 (available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-03-150A1.pdf).
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the end of 2003, it had reached almost 159 million.21 According to CTIA, the wireless
telecommunications industry trade association, in June 2004 there were almost 165,000,000
current U.S. wireless subscribers.22 During 2002, the mobile telephone industry generated over
$76 billion in revenues.23 This is not to say, however, that the wireless industry has surplus
cash.24
In its Triennial Report, the FCC termed this growth in the number of mass market
wireless subscriber lines “remarkable.” It added:
Over 90 percent of the United States population lives in counties served by three or more
wireless operators; about two in five Americans now have a mobile phone. Prices for
wireless service have steadily declined in recent years. . . . Notably, 3 to 5 percent of
wireless customers use their wireless phone as their only phone.25

Although in 2002 fewer than twopercent of subscribers had completely switched from
landline to wireless telephone service, wireless technology is becoming increasingly competitive
with landline telephone service.26 Also, mobile data services have grown rapidly, growing from

21

F.C.C. Industry Analysis and Technology Division, Wireline Competition Bureau, Trends in
Telephone Service, p. 11-3, Table 11-1 (“Measures of Mobile Wireless Telephone Subscribers), May
2004
(available
at
http://ftp.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Reports/FCCState_Link/IAD/trend504.pdf) [hereafter 2004 Trends].
22

See the CITA web site, http://www.ctia.org/news_media/press/body.cfm?record_id=1408 (listing
164,955,300 subscribers when visited on June 13, 2004).
23

Id. at para. 17.

24

See Laura H. Phillips & Jason E. Friedrich, Wireless: Can Regulatory “Business as Usual”
Continue?, 20 COMM. LAW. 12, 12 (Fall 2002) (noting that billions of dollars in equity have gone to build
out cellular systems and that the industry is in “a classic early state and has yet to mature and produce the
hoped-for financial payoff.”
25

Review of Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers;
Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability, Report and Order
and Order on Remand and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, CC Dkt. Nos. 01-338; 96-98; 98-147,
p. 40, para. 53 (Aug. 21, 2003) (available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-0336A1.pdf) [hereinafter Triennial Review Order].
26

Triennial Review Order at para. 228.
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between 2 and 2.5 million subscribers in 2000 to between 8 and 10 million subscribers in 2001.27
as “wireless technology continues to improve, wireless may become a more practical and
attractive alternative to wireline for data services.” In confirmation of the increasing importance
of wireless telephone service, the number of payphones in the U.S. has declined from over 2
million in 1997 to under 1.5 million in 2003.28
III. WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS AND HOMELAND SECURITY
A. A History of Concern about Security and Telecommunications
Interest in the role of telecommunications in protecting the security of the United States is
not a new phenomenon. In 1982, President Ronald Reagan established the President’s National
Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee.29 The Committee was given responsibility
to provide “information and advice from the perspective of the telecommunications industry with
respect to the implementation of Presidential Directive 53 (PD/NSC-53), National Security
Telecommunications Policy.”30 The federal government long has been cognizant of the need to
incorporate private facilities into emergency planning, including an early precursor of wireless
services, citizens band radio.31
In 1996, President William J. Clinton issuedExecutive Order No. 13010, noting that
“[c]ertain national infrastructures are so vital that their incapacity or destruction would have a
debilitating impact on the defense or economic security of the United States. These critical
infrastructures include telecommunications . . . .”32 While telecommunications obviously is

27

Id. at para. 53 n.185.

28

2004 Trends at p. 7-8, Table 7.6 (“Number of Payphones Over Time”).

29

Exec. Order No. 12,382, 47 Fed. Reg. 40,531 (1982).

30

Id. at § 2(a).

31

See 47 Fed. Reg. Doc. 82-1806 (1982) (FCC Notice treating, inter alia, approval of prototype plan
for “Citizens Band Radio Service Plan for the Support of Local Government During Emergencies.”
32

Exec. Order No. 13,010, 61 Fed. Reg. 37,347 (1996) (establishing the President’s Commission on
Critical Infrastructure Protection).
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necessary for national defense, the executive order also recognizes that it constitutes a crucial
component of our civilian economy.
The “public safety and non-commercial uses of wireless capabilities have continued to
grow. Public safety entities have attempted to improve their communications infrastructure to
meet, among other needs, homeland security requirements and to respond to national or local
emergencies.”33 Furthermore, “[w]ireless phones have gained new prominence as a result of the
critical role they played in reestablishing communications on September 11, 2001, and have
moved to the forefront of national emergency planning, national security, and priority access
regimes.”34 The events of 9-11 also have reminded private businesses as well as families of the
benefits of wireless communication in dealing with crisis situations.
B. The Homeland Security Act and Department of Homeland Security
Some 14 months after the devastating attacks against New York and Washington,
Congress passed the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (“HSA
” ).35 The HSA established the
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”).36 “The primary mission of the Department includes
reducing the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism, reducing damage that terrorist acts
might cause, and coordinating efforts to deal with natural and manmade crises. At the same time,
it should work to ensure that overall economic security is not diminished.37

33

Richard E. Wiley & Rosemary C. Harold, Communications Law 2003: Changes and Challenges,
316 (773 PLI/Pat 275).
34

Phillips & Friedrich, supra note 24, 12.

35

Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub.L. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 5, 6, 18, 44 & 49 U.S.C.A.).
36

6 U.S.C. § 111(a). For a detailed analysis and critique of the functions of DHS, see Jonathan
Thessin, Department of Homeland Security, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 513 (2003).
37

6 U.S.C. § 111(b) Mission
(1) In general
The primary mission of the Department is to-(A) prevent terrorist attacks within the United States;
(B) reduce the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism;
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Among the functions assigned the DHS Office of Science and Technology is “[t]o carry
out research, development, testing, evaluation, and cost-benefit analyses in fields that would
improve the safety, effectiveness, and efficiency of law enforcement technologies used by
Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies, including, but not limited to-- *** wire and
wireless interoperable communication technologies.38
A part of Title II of the HSA, known as the “Critical Infrastructure Information Act of
2002,”39 provides for the protection of voluntarily submitted information concerning critical
infrastructure.40 The term “critical infrastructure information,” is defined as “information not
customarily in the public domain and related to the security of critical infrastructure or protected
systems” that relates to actual or potential threats, weaknesses, or operational problems.41
Threats to critical infrastructure or protected systems includes “the misuse of or unauthorized
access to all types of communications and data transmission systems.”42 Likewise, “protected
systems” include a “communications network . . . or “data in transmission.43 Such voluntarily

(C) minimize the damage, and assist in the recovery, from terrorist attacks that do occur within the
United States;
(D) carry out all functions of entities transferred to the Department, including by acting as a focal
point regarding natural and manmade crises and emergency planning;
(E) ensure that the functions of the agencies and subdivisions within the Department that are not
related directly to securing the homeland are not diminished or neglected except by a specific
explicit Act of Congress;
(F) ensure that the overall economic security of the United States is not diminished by efforts,
activities, and programs aimed at securing the homeland; and
(G) monitor connections between illegal drug trafficking and terrorism, coordinate efforts to sever
such connections, and otherwise contribute to efforts to interdict illegal drug trafficking.
38

6 U.S.C. § 162(b)(6)(E).

39

Pub. L. 107-296, Title II, Subtitle B (§§ 211 to 215), Nov. 25, 2002, 116 Stat. 2150). See 6 U.S.C. §
101 (Note).
40

6 U.S.C § 131, Homeland Security Act of 2002, § 214.

41

6 U.S.C. § 131(3).

42

Id. at § 131(3)(A).

43

Id. at § 131(6)(B).
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shared information is exempted from Freedom of Information Act disclosure,44 and, inter alia,
from direct use by federal or state agencies in civil actions.45
The HSA was partly built upon earlier links between national preparedness and
telecommunications. In 1984, President Ronald Reagan issued Executive Order 12472,46
establishing a National Communications System (“NCS”). The NCS was charged, inter alia, with
responsiveness to “the national security and emergency preparedness needs of the President and
the Federal departments, agencies and other entities, including telecommunications in support of
national security leadership and continuity of government.”47 Also, the NCS would work to
ensure that the system was “capable of satisfying priority telecommunications requirements
under all circumstances through use of commercial, government and privately owned
telecommunications resources.”48 The FCC has promulgated regulations creating the
Telecommunications Service Priority System.49
For national security as well as for commercial purposes, wireless telephony, data
transmission, and the cyberinfrastructure are inextricably linked. Networked computers store and
move vast amounts of financial and other business data and transactions. “The National Research
Council noted more than a decade ago that ‘[t]hey control power delivery, communications,
aviation, and financial services. They are used to store vital information, from medical records to
business plans to criminal records.’”50 Wireless communications services play an important and

44

Id. at § 133(a)(1)(A) (referring to FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552).

45

Id. at § 133(a)(1)(C).

46

Exec Order No. 12472, 49 Fed. Reg. 13,471 (1984).

47

Id. § 1(c)(1).

48

Id. § 1(c)(2).

49

See, e.g., Priority Access Service (PAS) for National Security and Emergency Preparedness
(NSEP), 47 C.F.R. Pt. 64, App. B.
50

Emily Frye, The Tragedy of the Cybercommons: Overcoming Fundamental Vulnerabilities to
Critical Infrastructures in a Networked World, 58 BUS. LAW. 349, 350 (2002) (quoting NAT’L RESEARCH
COUNCIL, COMPUTERS AT RISK: SAFE COMPUTING IN THE INFORMATION AGE 7 (1991).
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growing role in data transmission. In a 2003 report, the FCC published the estimate of an
industry analyst that “11.9 million, or 8 percent, of the 141.8 [million] mobile phone subscribers
at the end of 2002 subscribed to some type of mobile Internet service.”51 Furthermore, “[a]n
additional 2.3 million consumers subscribed to mobile Internet services on data-only mobile
devices at the end of 2002.52
C. Homeland Security Activities of Wireless Telecommunications Industry
According to CITA, the wireless telecommunications industry trade association, industry
efforts to support homeland security as of May 2004 included:
• Many of the major wireless carriers have developed a fleet of COW’s or Cell Sites on
Wheels. These systems are sent to areas in need to replace towers that may have been
damaged or destroyed. Other carriers have launched satellite versions of the smaller
mobile sites - SatCOLTs - to help get networks back up and running after disasters.
These sites can be up and running in a matter of hours to ensure communications
continue during and after emergency situations.
• Multiple wireless carriers are in the process of implementing a Priority Access program
allowing government officials and first responders access to wireless networks in the
event of an emergency. Under this system, wireless carriers allocate a certain amount of
capacity for priority users during emergencies. Priority service does not terminate calls in
progress - rather, as callers hang up, the switch designates a portion of the newly vacated
voice channels to authorized priority users, who must dial in a feature code. Regardless
of how high wireless usage surges, public safety officials will still be able to
communicate in an emergency situation.
• The Washington, D.C. area will soon be home to the Capital Wireless Integrated
Network, a secure and powerful wireless network allowing officials from more than 40

51

Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Annual
Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions With Respect to Commercial Mobile Services,
WT Docket No. 02-379, Eighth Report, FCC 03-150 (rel. Jul. 14, 2003), at para. 17 (available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-03-150A1.pdf) (quoting Luiz Carvalho, et al., A
Look at Wireless Data: Don’t Short SMS, Morgan Stanley, Equity Research – Wireless Telecom Services,
Mar. 2, 2003 at 3).
52

Id.
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local, state and federal agencies to communicate with each other using instant messaging
on devices such as PCs, PDAs, and data-enabled mobile phones.53

IV. TOWER SITING AND THE NIMBY PROBLEM
A. Tragedy of the Commons and the Anticommons
Garrett Hardin,54 in his classic exposition of the “tragedy of the commons,” posited that
everyone has a huge incentive to overexploit a common resource and fail to manage it prudently,
since many others will do the same and will not be impressed by isolated examples of good
stewardship.55 The tragedy of the anticommons, on the other hand, is that so many individuals
and groups might have property rights that include veto power over a resource so that it would be
impractical or impossible for the resource to be economically developed.56
A significant problem facing the United States is that we have a national commons,
dubbed a “cybercommons,” that is comprised of data production, storage, and communications
networks.57 While the internet is a substantial element of the cybercommons, internet traffic
increasingly is being conducted through wireless telecommunications.58 The cybercommons has
become an integral part of a much older commons–the common market that was one of the

53

CTIA Public Affairs Press Release, Homeland Security Supported by Wireless Initiatives, May 28,
2004. Available at http://www.ctia.org/news_media/press/body.cfm?record_id=1408.
54

Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).

55

However, Hardin actually was referring to an “open access regime,” where no one claims ownership
rights, rather than to a “commons,” which is the collective property of a defined group. See David D.
Haddock & Lynne Kiesling, The Black Death and Property Rights, J. LEG. STUD. 545, 557 (2002). See
also, Henry E. Smith, Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the Open Fields, 29 J. LEGAL
STUD. 131 (2000) (describing complex pattern of private and common land uses in medieval fields). True
commons resources may be open access to group members, but are private property to outsiders. Shi-Ling
Hsu, A Two-Dimensional Framework For Analyzing Property Rights Regimes, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
813, 817 n.12 (2003).
56

See, Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to
Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998).
57

See Frey, supra note 50.

58

See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
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principal objects of the Framers when they created a nation of which places great emphasis on
the protection of interstate commerce from the parochial concerns of individual states.59 To a
certain extent, owners of intellectual property and specialized resources in cyberspace band
together to establish and police their own common areas within the overall cybercommons as is
practical.60
In protecting the cybercommons and wireless telecommunications we face a collective
problem. The costs of organizing and coordinating large numbers of individuals and
organizations is great. Typically, the amount at stake for any single member is so small as to
make organization utterly impractical. As the late Mancur Olson argued in his classic The Logic
of Collective Action:61
[U]nless the number of individuals is quite small, or unless there is coercion or some
other special device to make individuals act in their common interest, rational, selfinterested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests.62

While the majority of adult Americans now enjoy the benefits of wireless
communications, that benefit is so diffused that it is difficult to entice individuals to expend time
and resources to defend it. On the other hand, the seamless web of wireless communications is
vulnerable to more parochial concerns. Wireless towers must grow in number and must be
located in individual polities, often small and homogeneous suburban municipalities, that are in a
practical position to block or hinder the national telecommunications network.
If we want to prevent a “tragedy of the cybercommons”63 resulting from national security
threats such as terrorism, we will require intervention by the HAS, other federal agencies, and

59

QQ Need cite.

60

Id. at 361-362 (describing private-sector efforts to protect cyberinfrastructure). See also Carol Rose,
The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission Trades and Ecosystems, 83
MINN. L. REV. 129, 155 (1998).
61

MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965).

62

Id. at 2 (emphasis in original).

63

See Frey, supra note 50.
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collaborating state and local law enforcement units. In addition, however, the nurturing of a
robust and growing telecommunications network protecting the economy as well as national
security requires thatanticommons claims be held in check. This necessitates the development of
governmental policies that do not unduly hinder private efforts to develop robust
communications networks.
B. The NIMBY Problem
The NIMBY (“not in my back yard”) syndrome reflects the fact that owner-occupied
housing is the most valuable asset that the vast majority of people ever will own and their
rational belief that deterioration in the neighborhood will affect its value.64 This accounts for
homeowners exquisite interest in neighborhood change. According to Professor William Fischel,
a Dartmouth land use economist and sometimes public servant:
NIMBYs show up at the zoning and planning board reviews, to which almost all
developers of more-than-minor subdivisions must submit. If NIMBYs fail to reduce the
scale and density of the project at these reviews, they often deploy alternative regulatory
rationales, such as environmental impact statements, historic districts, aboriginal burial
sites, agricultural preservation, wetlands, flood plains, access for the disabled and
protection of (often unidentified) endangered species at other local, state and federal
government forums, including courts of law. I have heard all of these arguments, and
others too elaborately bizarre to list, in my ten years as a member of the Hanover, New
Hampshire zoning board. And if NIMBYs fail in these efforts, they seek, often by direct
democratic initiatives, to have the local zoning and planning regulations changed to make
sure that similar developments do not happen again.65

NIMBYism also affects individuals’ reactions to wireless towers.66 The following
anecdote is but one example:
Henry county commissioners are working on plans to strengthen the county’s ordinance
governing sites for [wireless communications] towers.

64

See William A. Fischel, Voting, Risk Aversion, and the NIMBY Syndrome: A Comment on Robert
Nelson’s “Privatizing the Neighborhood,”7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 881, 881 (1999).
65

Id at 881-882.

66

See Malcolm J. Tuesley, Note, Not in My Backyard: The siting of Wireless Communications
Facilities, 51 FED. COMM. L.J. 887, 897 (1999).
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“By and large, the towers are ugly, and people don’t want them in their back yards,” said
Commissioner Brian Williams. “If folks would stay off their cell phones there would be
no need for the towers,” the commissioner said before he ended an interview using his
cell phone.67

The following excerpt from a 1998 Fourth Circuit case involving the attempt by a church
to lease some of its property for wireless towers gives some flavor of the circumstances that
often underlie a permit denial:
Virginia Beach’s Zoning Ordinance required the Church to secure a conditional use
permit to allow AT & T and PrimeCo to build their towers. Accordingly, the Church filed
an application with the City Planning Department, which, after making some
modifications to appellees’ proposal, recommended approval to the City Planning
Commission. The Planning Commission then held a public hearing on January 8, 1997.
Representatives of the companies and of the Church advocated approving the application,
as did some commissioners and city officials, but numerous area residents spoke against
approval, largely on the grounds that such a commercial use of the Church property was
improper in a residential area and that the towers, even with various aesthetic
modifications made by the companies, would be eyesores. One resident submitted a
petition in opposition, with ninety signatures that he had collected in the day and a half
prior to the hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Planning Commission voted
unanimously, with one abstention, to recommend that the City Council approve the
application.
The City Council considered the application at its meeting on March 25, 1997. Having
been provided with copies of the Planning Department’s report, the transcript of the
Planning Commission hearing, and the various application materials, the City Council
also heard further testimony on the matter. Again, representatives of the companies and
of the Church explained and supported the application; numerous area residents spoke, all
of those not affiliated with the Church being opposed. One resident, Mr. Wayne Shank,
presented petitions with over seven hundred signatures in opposition. The Council also
appears to have had before it one shorter petition supporting the application and various
letters to councilmen on the matter, both in support and in opposition. The only
councilman to speak on the merits, Councilman William Harrison (who represents Little
Neck), voiced his opposition in light of the testimony of area residents who did not think
that improved service was worth the burden of having the towers looming over them.

67

Peter Scott, Communication Towers Follow the Growth, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION,
December 28, 2000, J15.
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The Council ultimately voted unanimously to deny the application . . . .68

From the industry’s point of view, NIMBYism presents a vexing addition to an elaborate
regulatory process:
Imagine that you own a business in a service industry. Before you can operate this
business, the federal government requires that you purchase an expensive license
allowing you to conduct your business within a specific geographic area. In addition,
before you can expand your infrastructure to improve and expand your services, you must
receive approval from the local zoning board. When you apply to the local zoning board
for a conditional use permit to site your new infrastructure, and you satisfy all of the
board’s requirements, they deny your application; local citizens groups have pressured
this board to implement a moratorium against the expansion of businesses of your type.
The basis for this moratorium is steeped in myth and unfounded community hysteria that
your infrastructure causes cancer and birth defects, deflates adjacent property values, and
the prevailing attitude that your business has already expanded enough within city limits.
The board even hears testimony from an environmental group arguing that your industry
regulations were written by a former Nazi thus making them illegal. This hypothetical
scenario may sound far-fetched, but it occurs on a daily basis in the wireless
telecommunications industry.69

C. The Need for Congressional Action
In 1995, the U.S. House of Representatives passed H.R. 1555, the “Communications Act
of 1995.” The bill was designed to decrease the price and encourage the development of new
telecommunications technologies through deregulation.70 Section 107, would amend the
Communications Act of 193471 by adding a provision on “Facilities Siting Policies.”72 The

68

AT & T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City Council of Virginia Beach 155 F.3d 423, 425 (4th Cir. 1998).

69

David W. Hughes, When NIMBYs Attack: The Heights to Which Communities Will Climb to Prevent
the Siting of Wireless Towers, 23 J. CORP. L. 469, 470 (1998).
70

71

H.R. 1555, 104th Cong. (1995).
47 U.S.C. §§ 151-614.

72

Sec. 107. Facilities Siting; Radio Frequency Emission Standards.
(a) NATIONAL WIRELESS TELECOMMUNICATIONS SITING POLICY- Section 332(c) of the
Act (47 U.S.C. 332(c)) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
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House’s intent was to provide federal standards for wireless communications tower siting, with
some local input. In reporting out H.R. 1555, the Commerce Committee discussed why it
believed such action necessary:

(7) Facilities Siting Policies- (A) Within 180 days after enactment of this paragraph, the Commission
shall prescribe and make effective a policy regarding State and local regulation of the placement,
construction, modification, or operation of facilities for the provision of commercial mobile services.
(B) Pursuant to subchapter III of chapter 5, title 5, United States Code, the Commission shall establish
a negotiated rulemaking committee to negotiate and develop a proposed policy to comply with the
requirements of this paragraph. Such committee shall include representatives from State and local
gov ernments, affected industries, and public safety agencies. In negotiating and developing such a
policy, the committee shall take into account–
(i) the desirability of enhancing the coverage and quality of commercial mobile services and
fostering competition in the provision of such services;
(ii) the legitimate interests of State and local governments in matters of exclusively local concern;
(iii) the effect of State and local regulation of facilities siting on interstate commerce; and
(iv) the administrative costs to State and local governments of reviewing requests for authorization to
locate facilities for the provision of commercial mobile services.
(C) The policy prescribed pursuant to this paragraph shall ensure that–
(i) regulation of the placement, construction, and modification of facilities for the provision of
commercial mobile services by any State or local government or instrumentality thereof–
(I) is reasonable, nondiscriminatory, and limited to the minimum necessary to accomplish the State
or local government’s legitimate purposes; and
(II) does not prohibit or have the effect of precluding any commercial mobile service; and
(ii) a State or local government or instrumentality thereof shall act on any request for authorization to
locate, construct, modify, or operate facilities for the provision of commercial mobile services within
a reasonable period of time after the request is fully filed with such government or instrumentality;
and
(iii) any decision by a State or local government or instrumentality thereof to deny a request for
authorization to locate, construct, modify, or operate facilities for the provision of commercial
mobile services shall be in writing and shall be supported by substantial evidence contained in a
written record.
(D) The policy prescribed pursuant to this paragraph shall provide that no State or local government or
any instrumentality thereof may regulate the placement, construction, modification, or operation of
such facilities on the basis of the environmental effects of radio frequency emissions, to the extent that
such facilities comply with the Commission’s regulations concerning such emissions.
(E) In accordance with subchapter III of chapter 5, title 5, United States Code, the Commission shall
periodically establish a negotiated rulemaking committee to review the policy prescribed by the
Commission under this paragraph and to recommend revisions to such policy.’.
[Subsections (b) Radio Frequency Emissions and (c) Availability of [Federal] Property are omitted.]
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The Committee finds that current State and local requirements, siting and zoning
decisions by non-federal units of government, have created an inconsistent and, at times,
conflicting patchwork of requirements which will inhibit the deployment of Personal
Communications Services (PCS) as well as the rebuilding of a digital technology-based
cellular telecommunications network. The Committee believes it is in the national interest
that uniform, consistent requirements, with adequate safeguards of the public health and
safety, be established as soon as possible. Such requirements will ensure an appropriate
balance in policy and will speed deployment and the availability of competitive wireless
telecommunications services which ultimately will provide consumers with lower costs
as well as with a greater range and options for such services.73

Notable among the House “Facilities Siting Policies” provisions were the establishment
of a rulemaking committee that would develop policy and that would comprise the major
interested groups, state and local officials, public safety agencies, and representatives from
“affected

industries,” which, presumably,

would include user groups

as well as

telecommunications providers.74 This group would explicitly take into account, on the one hand,
the enhancement of wireless services and competition among providers,75 and the effects of local
regulation of siting on interstate commerce.76 On the other hand, it would take into account “the
legitimate interests of State and local governments in matters of exclusively local concern,”77 as
well as the administrative costs incurred by municipalities in processing facility location
requests.78 The objects of the policy to be developed would ensure, inter alia, that local and state
regulation of “the placement, construction, and modification of facilities” “is reasonable,

73

H.R. REP. NO. 104-104(I), at 94 (1995) 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 1995 WL 442504 (July 24, 1995).

74

H.R. 1551 at § 107(a)(7)(B).

75

Id. at § 107(a)(7)(B)(i).

76

Id. at § 107(a)(7)(B)(iii).

77

Id. at § 107(a)(7)(B)(ii).

78

Id. at § 107(a)(7)(B)(iv).
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nondiscriminatory, and limited to the minimum necessary to accomplish the State or local
government’s legitimate purposes.”79
H.R. 1555 also included a provision that the federal government make federal property,
including rights of way and easements, available for wireless telecommunications facility siting
to the greatest extent possible.80 Finally, it provided that, on the basis of this deliberative process,
and within 180 days after the siting policies were enacted, the FCC “shall prescribe and make
effective a policy regarding State and local regulation of the placement, construction,
modification, or operation of facilities for the provision of commercial mobile services.”81
The House Commerce Committee was not unaware of the concerns that local officials
had about federal intervention in land use regulation pertaining to towers. It declared:
The Committee recognizes that there are legitimate State and local concerns involved in
regulating the siting of such facilities and believes the negotiated rulemaking committee
should address those matters, such as aesthetic values and the costs associated with the
use and maintenance of public rights-of-way. The intent of the Committee is that
requirements resulting from the negotiated rulemaking committee’s work and subsequent
Commission rulemaking will allow construction of a CMRS network at a lower cost for
siting and construction compatible with legitimate public health, safety and property
protections while fully addressing the legitimate concerns of all affected parties and
providing certainty for planning and building.82

The siting provisions of H.R. 1555 had considerable opposition in the House itself.
Representative James Moran, whose proffered amendment was not permitted to come to a vote,83
declared that there was
a real sleeper in this bill, and that is with regard to the siting of these control towers.
There are about 20,000 of them around the country now. There are going to be about

79

Id. at § 107(a)(7)(C)(i) and (C)(i)(I).

80

Id. at § 107(c).

81

Id. at § 107(a)(7)(A).

82

H.R. Rep. 104-204(I), at 94-95, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 1995 WL 442504 (July 24, 1995).

83

See 141 Cong. Rec. H8269-02, *H8272 (noting a 6-5 vote in the Rules Committee).
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100,000. Our amendment said on private property, if you try to site a commercial tower,
then the people that own that property have a right to go to their local zoning board.
Of course they have the right. Imagine if somebody tries to put a 150 foot tower on your
property, and you object, and they tell you, “Well, the Congress gave us the authority to
put it on. It is a Federal law. It supersedes local zoning authority.” That is the last thing
we want to be doing.84

The Senate bill corresponding to H.R. 1555 had no provision respecting
telecommunications siting. The House-Senate conference produced the subsequently enacted
version of the TCA. This version did contain a siting facilities provision, but it was considerable
different from that adopted by the House.
The conference agreement creates a new section 704 which prevents Commission
preemption of local and State land use decisions and preserves the authority of State and
local governments over zoning and land use matters except in the limited circumstances
set forth in the conference agreement..85

V. THE TCA SITING POLICY ATTEMPTS A BALANCE OF RIGHTS
A. TheT elecommunications Act of 1996
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 (TCA)86 has been described by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit as “an omnibus overhaul of the federal regulation of
communications companies, intended to provide for a pro-competitive, deregulatory national
policy framework designed to accelerate rapidly private sector deployment of advanced
telecommunications and information technologies and services . . . by opening all
telecommunications markets to competition . . . .”87

84

141 Cong. Rec. H8269-02, *H8275 (Aug. 2, 1995).

85

H.R. CONF. REP. 104-458, 207-208 (1996).

86

Pub. L. 104-104, Feb. 8, 1996, 110 Stat. 56 (codified in scattered provisions of 47 U.S.C.).

87

Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Craig Willoth, 176 F.3d 630, 637 (2nd Cir. 1999)
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The Siting Policy of the TCA is styled “Preservation of local zoning authority.”88 State
and local authority pertaining to “decisions regarding the placement, construction, and

88

(a) NATIONAL WIRELESS TELECOMMUNICATIONS SITING POLICY.--Section 332(c) (47
U.S.C. 332(c)) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
(7) Preservation of local zoning authority
(A) General authority
Except as provided in this paragraph, nothing in this chapter shall limit or affect the authority of a
State or local government or instrumentality thereof over decisions regarding the placement,
construction, and modification of personal wireless service facilities.
(B) Limitations
(i) The regulation of the placement, construction, and modification of personal wireless service
facilities by any State or local government or instrumentality thereof-(I) shall not unreasonably discriminate among providers of functionally equivalent services; and
(II) shall not prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the provision of personal wireless services.
(ii) A State or local government or instrumentality thereof shall act on any request for authorization
to place, construct, or modify personal wireless service facilities within a reasonable period of time
after the request is duly filed with such government or instrumentality, taking into account the nature
and scope of such request.
(iii) Any decision by a State or local government or instrumentality thereof to deny a request to
place, construct, or modify personal wireless service facilities shall be in writing and supported by
substantial evidence contained in a written record.
(iv) No State or local government or instrumentality thereof may regulate the placement,
construction, and modification of personal wireless service facilities on the basis of the
environmental effects of radio frequency emissions to the extent that such facilities comply with the
Commission’s regulations concerning such emissions.
(v) Any person adversely affected by any final action or failure to act by a State or local government
or any instrumentality thereof that is inconsistent with this subparagraph may, within 30 days after
such action or failure to act, commence an action in any court of competent jurisdiction. The court
shall hear and decide such action on an expedited basis. Any person adversely affected by an act or
failure to act by a State or local government or any instrumentality thereof that is inconsistent with
clause (iv) may petition the Commission for relief.
(C) Definitions
For purposes of this paragraph-(i) the term “personal wireless services” means commercial mobile services, unlicensed wireless
services, and common carrier wireless exchange access
services;
(ii) the term “personal wireless service facilities” means facilities for the provision of personal
wireless services; and
(iii) the term “unlicensed wireless service” means the offering of telecommunications services using
duly authorized devices which do not require individual licenses, but does not mean the provision of
direct-to-home satellite services (as defined in section 303(v) of this title).
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modification of personal wireless service facilities” are limited or affected only by the specific
limitations contained in the siting paragraph.89 Beyond those limitations, nothing in the
Communications Act would limit or affect the authority of a State or local government or
instrumentality thereof over decisions regarding the “placement, construction, and modification
of personal wireless service facilities,” “except as provided in this [siting] paragraph.”90
While the House version would have cabined local discretion within negotiated policies
established by the FCC, the Conference Committee attempted to temper such discretion
primarily through the imposition of procedure. This is not to say that Section 704 retains none of
the bite of the FCC siting rules envisioned in the House version. “The TCA ‘effects substantive
changes to the local zoning process ... by preempting any local regulations, including zoning
regulations, which conflict with its provisions.’”91 Accordingly, local zoning measures are
permissible only to the extent they do not interfere with the TCA.92 The particular statutory
language provides that, although the TCA preserves local zoning authority in all other respects
over the siting of wireless facilities, “the method by which siting decisions are made is now
subject to judicial oversight.”93 Specifically, according to the language of the TCA, a denial of a
request to build wireless facilities must be “in writing and supported by substantial evidence
contained in a written record.”94
That said, preemptive exceptions to a contrary default rule do not augur for smooth
implementation. The result of legislation that embodies “seemingly mutually exclusive

89

47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7).

90

Id. at § 332(c)(7)(A).

91

SBA Communications, Inc. v. Zoning Comm’n of Town of Brookfield, 112 F.Supp.2d 233
(D.Conn. 2000) (quoting Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. Town of Easton, 982 F.Supp. 47, 50 (D. Mass. 1997)).
92

Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. Town of Easton, 982 F.Supp. 47, 50 (D. Mass. 1997).

93

Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Craig Willoth, 176 F.3d 630, 637 (2nd Cir. 1999) (citing § 332(c)(7)(A) of
the Communications Act as revised by the TCA).
94

Id. (citing § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii)).
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propositions”95 might better be described as a lack of clarity masquerading as simplicity. As the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has noted, the Siting Policy “fairly bristles with
potential issues, from the proper allocation of the burden of proof through the available remedies
for violation of the statute’s requirements.”96
Courts interpreting the Siting Policy have been cognizant of the need to balance its
conflicting goals. Section 704 “works like a scale that . . . attempts to balance to two objects of
competing weight: on the one arm sits the need to accelerate the deployment of
telecommunications technology, while on the other arm rests the desire to preserve state and
local control over land use matters.”97 Similarly, it is “a deliberate compromise between two
competing aims–to facilitate nationally the growth of wireless telephone service and to maintain
substantial local control over siting of towers.”98
Putting it another way, in adopting the Siting Policy, Congress attempted to have the
federal vs. local regulatory conundrum decided both ways. Congressman Thomas Bliley,
chairman of the Commerce Committee at the time of the TCA’s enactment, explained:
Nothing is in this bill that prevents a locality . . . from determining where a cellular pole
should be located, but we do want to make sure that this technology is available across
the country, that we do not allow a community to say we are not going to have any
cellular pole in our locality. That is wrong. Nor are we going to say they can delay these
people forever. But the location will be determined by the local governing body.99

95

Kevin M. O’Neill, Note, Wireless Facilities are a Towering Problem: How can Local Zoning
Boards Make the Call Without Violating Section 704 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996?, 40 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 975, 984 (1999).
96

Cellular Telephone Co. v. Town of Oyster Bay, 166 F.3d 490, 492 (2nd Cir. 1999).

97

ATC Realty, LLC v. Town of Kingston, 303 F.3d 91, 94 (1st Cir. 2002).

98

Town of Amherst v. Omnipoint Communications Enters., Inc., 173 F.3d 9, 13 (1st Cir. 1999).

99

141 Cong. Rec. H8274 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1995) (statement of Rep. Bliley).
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B. Specific Siting Policy Provisions
Since Section 704 operate not through affirmative federal rules, but rather through
oversight of the operation of state and local land use decisions, their real significance must be
gleaned from an examination of judicial review of specific provisions.
1. Burden of Proof.
Given that so many of the reasons why a tower application might be denied are
subjective, or at least not easily quantifiable, establishing which party has the burden of proof is
important in the determination. The Siting Policy contains no provision explicitly assigning the
burden.
Courts are divided as to whether Section 704 shifts the burden of proof to the government
agency that denied the applicant’s siting request. In Omnipoint Communications Enterprises, Inc.
v. Town of Amherst,100 the court held that, once the carrier has come forward with minimal
information in support of its application, the Siting Policy “places the burden of proof to support
any denial on the local government entity issuing the denial.”101 Other courts have agreed.102
In Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. Town of Easton,103 the court explained that the burden is on the
government “rather than burdening the applicant with producing substantial evidence supporting
its approval.”104 Easton added that “because the TCA ‘effectively preempts state law in several

100

74 F.Supp.2d 109 (D.N.H.1998).

101

Id. at 122.

102

See,e.g ., Smart SMR of N.Y., Inc. v. Zoning Comm’n, 995 F.Supp. 52, 56 (D. Conn. 1998); Cellco
Partnership v. Town Plan & Zoning Comm’n, 3 F.Supp.2d 178, 182 (D. Conn. 1998); PrimeCo Personal
Communications L.P. v. Village of Fox Lake, 26 F.Supp.2d 1052, 1064 (N.D. Ill. 1998); Laurence Wolf
Capital Management Trust v. City of Ferndale, 128 F.Supp.2d 441 (E.D.Mich. 2000), aff’d in part, rev’d
in part, 61 Fed.Appx. 204 (6th Cir. 2003).
103

982 F.Supp. 47 (D. Mass. 1997).

104

Id. at 49 (citing United States Cellular Corp. v. Board of Adjustment of City of Des Moines, Polk
County District Court, LACL No. CL 00070195 (Iowa Dist. Ct. for Polk County Jan. 2, 1997)).
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respects, including the burden of proof, . . . it is the Board’s burden to produce substantial
evidence supporting its denial of plaintiff’s application.’”105
Other courts have held that the burden is on the applicant. The reasoning in Easton, for
instance, was attacked by a U.S. District Court in Michigan in New Par v. City of Saginaw:106
This Court is not persuaded by [Easton’s] reasoning, nor can it find any justification for a
burden-shifting requirement in the plain language of the Act, especially in light of the
provision stating that “nothing in this chapter shall limit or affect the authority of a State
or local government or instrumentality thereof over decisions regarding the placement,
construction, and modification of personal wireless service facilities.”107

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, ruled similarly in Southwestern Bell
Mobile System, Inc. v. Todd,108 where it said that there was nothing in the Act that would
“support placing a burden upon the Board.”109 Other courts have concurred.110
2. Discrimination Among Providers
Section 704’s requirement that localities “shall not unreasonably discriminate among
providers of functionally equivalent services”111 prohibits digital wireless communications
service permit denials on the basis that satisfactory analogue service is already in place. In AT &

105

Id. at 52 (quoting United States Cellular Corp., at 5).

106

161 F.Supp.2d 759 (E.D.Mich. 2001).

107

Id. at 768 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(A)).

108

244 F.3d 51 (1st Cir. 2001).

109

Id. at 63.

110

See, e.g., MetroPCS, Inc. v. City of San Francisco, 259 F.Supp.2d 1004 (N.D.Cal. 2003) (applicant
had burden of proof to show that city planning commission’s denial of conditional use permit to allow
mounting of antennas on parking garage roof was not based upon the substantial evidence on the record).
See also, VoiceStream Minneapolis, Inc. v. St. Croix County, 342 F.3d 818, 830-831 (7th Cir. 2003);
American Tower LP v. City of Huntsville, 295 F.3d 1203, 1207 (11th Cir.2002).
111

47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II).
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T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City Council of City of Virginia Beach,112 the District Court found the
anti-discrimination requirement violated when the only basis in the record for the denial was one
councilman’s assertion that local residents were satisfied with their current analog service and
did not wish for, or felt they needed, digital service.113
3. Prohibition of Wireless Services
The heart of the House-Senate compromise, embodied in Section 704, is that states and
localities can regulate the placement of wireless towers, but cannot prohibit them.114 This
requirement is explicit,115 but the courts have split on its meaning. The Fourth Circuit
consistently has taken the position that “a telecommunications provider could not prevail in a
challenge to an individual zoning decision absent a general ban or policy to reject all
applications.”116 Furthermore “[t]he burden for the carrier invoking this provision is a heavy one:
to show from language or circumstances not just that this application has been rejected, but that
further reasonable efforts are so likely to be fruitless that it is a waste of time to try.”117 Other
courtshave agreed .118

112

979 F.Supp. 416 (E.D. Va. 1997), aff’d in part, reversed in part, 155 F.3d 423 (4th Cir. 1998).

113

Id. at 425.

114

See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 99 (statement of Congressman Thomas Bliley).

115

47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II) (stating that state and local siting regulations “shall not prohibit or
have the effect of prohibiting the provision of personal wireless services”).
116

USCOC of Virginia RSA #3, Inc. v. Montgomery County Bd. of Supervisors, 343 F.3d 262, 268
(4th Cir. 2003) (citing AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City Council of Virginia Beach, 155 F.3d 423, 428
(4th Cir. 1998)).
117

Id. (quoting 360° Communications Co. of Charlottesville v. Board of Supervisors of Albemarle
County, 211 F.3d 79, 88 (4th Cir. 2000)).
118

See, e.g., Cellco Partnership v. Town Plan and Zoning Comm’n of the Town of Farmington, 3
F.Supp.2d 178, 184-85 (D.Conn. 1998); AT&T Wireless Services of Fla., Inc. v. Orange County, 982
F.Supp. 856, 860 (M.D. Fla.1997).
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The First Circuit’s approach, announced in Town of Amherst v. Omnipoint
Communications Enterprises, Inc. ,119 disparaged the town’s assertion that the Act prohibited
only “‘general’ bans.”120 “If the criteria [for permit approvals] or their administration effectively
preclude towers no matter what the carrier does, they may amount to a ban ‘in effect’ even
though substantial evidence will almost certainly exist for the denial.”121
The Second Circuit propounded an “effects” test, in Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Willoth,122
that stressed whether governmental acts constituted a refusal to permit service in a particular part
of the municipality.123
[T]he plain focus of the statute is on whether it is possible for a user in a given remote
location to reach a facility that can establish connections to the national telephone
network. … In other words, local governments must allow service providers to fill gaps
in the ability of wireless telephones to have access to land-lines. *** A local government
may reject an application for construction of a wireless service facility in an under-served
area without thereby prohibiting personal wireless services if the service gap can be
closed by less intrusive means…. 124

However, Willoth added that holes in coverage that are “very limited in number or size” are
treated as de minimis.125
While the foregoing seemed sufficient to establish the contours of “gap” in terms of
physical space, the Siting Policy is concerned with gaps in wireless service. Courts are split on

119

173 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 1999).

120

Id. at 14.

121

Id.

122

176 F.3d 630 (2nd Cir. 1999).

123

See Town of Amherst v. Omnipoint Communications Enters., Inc., 173 F.3d 9, 14 (1st Cir. 1999);
Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Willoth, 176 F.3d 630, 642-643 (2nd Cir. 1999); APT Pittsburgh L.P. v. Penn
Pp., 196 F.3d 469, 478-479 (3rd Cir. 1999).
124

Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. Willoth 176 F.3d 630, 643 (2nd Cir. 1999).

125

Id. at 643-644 (giving as illustrations “the interiors of buildings in a sparsely populated rural area,
or confined to a limited number of houses or spots as the area covered by buildings increases”).
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whether “gap,” in this context, means “gap in receiving service,” or “gap in providing
service.”126 Some, including the Third Circuit, have examined the gap from the customer’s
perspective.127 First Circuit has taken the provider’s perspective.128 Courts also are split on
whether to take the perspective of the customer who otherwise would not be provided with a
given technology.129
In VoiceStream Minneapolis, Inc. v. St. Croix County,130 the Seventh Circuit held that the
applicant failed to meet its “heavy burden” of establishing that its proposal to build a 185-foot
tower in scenic river district was the only feasible plan for closing a gap in its coverage.
Although several alternatives to the proposed site were suggested by the county, the applicant
did not thoroughly investigate the viability of the alternatives.131
This does not mean, however, that the potential availability of “alternative sites” which
are neither actually available nor technically feasible will defeat an effective prohibition claim.
In Nextel Communications of Mid-Atlantic, Inc. v. Town of Sudbury,132 the court concluded that
the town “was in fact unwilling” to issue permits for “the only other sites which would

126

Independent Wireless One Corp. v. Town of Charlotte, 242 F.Supp.2d 409, 417-420 (D.Vt. 2003).

127

Nextel W. Corp. v. Unity Twp., 282 F.3d 257, 265-266 (3rd Cir. 2002); SiteTech Group, Ltd. v.
Bd. of Zoning Appeals of Town of Brookhaven, 140 F.Supp.2d 255, 259 (E.D.N.Y. 2001).
128

Second Generation Properties, LP v. Town of Pelham, 313 F.3d 620 (1st Cir. 2002).

129

Western PCS II Corp. v. Extraterritorial Zoning Authority, 957 F.Supp. 1230 (D.N.M. 1997)
(holding denial of permit to only provider of digital technology in specified area to constitute a
prohibition where customers otherwise limited to analog service only). Accord, Sprint Spectrum L.P. v.
Jefferson County, 968 F.Supp. 1457, 1468 (N.D.Ala. 1997). Contra, Iowa Wireless Services, L.P. v. City
of Miline, 29 F.Supp.2d 915, 923 (C.D.Ill. 1998).
130

342 F.3d 818 (7th Cir. 2003).

131

VoiceStream Minneapolis, Inc. v. St. Croix County 342 F.3d 818, *835 (C.A.7 (Wis.),2003)

132

No. Civ. A. 01-11754-DPW, 2003 WL 543383 (D. Mass. Feb. 26, 2003) (not reported in
F.Supp.2d).
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conceivably have met Nextel’s coverage needs without requiring zoning relief.”133
Unwillingness or hostility have factored in other prohibition cases as well.134 The gravamen of
these cases is ostensible cooperation masking prohibition. The First Circuit observed, in National
Tower, LLC v. Plainville Zoning Bd. of Appeals,135 that “[s]etting out criteria under the zoning
law that no one could ever meet is an example of effective prohibition.”136
While localities may not regulate so as to prohibit wireless communications service, they
have not affirmative duty to lease municipal property for wireless communications towers, even
if there is no practical alternative site. Propriety refusals to lease do not constitute regulatory or
zoning prohibitions.137
4. “Reasonable Period” for Consideration of Applications
The TCA provides that facilities siting requests must be acted upon “within a reasonable
period of time after the request is duly filed with such government or instrumentality, taking into
account the nature and scope of such request.”138
In Town of Amherst v. Omnipoint Communications Enterprises, Inc. ,139 the First Circuit
chastised the locality that it must “face reality” and refrain from demanding and rejecting
successive applications without enunciating a clear indication of its expectations.140 “While

133

Id. at *13 (noting statements by local officials that “the Selectmen see no need or desire to issue
any more [permits]”).
134

See, e.g., Omnipoint Holdings v. Town of Westford, 206 F.Supp.2d 166, 172 (D. Mass. 2002)
(noting that “fixed hostility” of Board suggests that further applications would be futile).
135

297 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 2002).

136

Id. at 23.

137

Omnipoint Communications Enters., L.P. v. Township of Nether Providence, 232 F.Supp.2d 430
(E.D. Pa. 2002).
138

47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii)

139

173 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 1999).

140

Id. at 16-17.
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prepared to tolerate some delay, Congress made clear in two different provisions that it expected
expeditious resolution both by the local authorities and by courts called upon to enforce the
federal limitations.”141
5. Denials Shall be in Writing
The requirement of Section 704 that the denial of a permit request “shall be in writing”142
seems clear cut. Yet, even here there are complications. First, there is the problem of defining a
permit “request.” In order to be entitled to the benefits of this provision, the applicant must have
“supported its permit application with a ‘certain minimal amount of information.’”143
More fundamentally, in Southwestern Bell Mobile System v. Todd,144 the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit considered the scope of judicial review with reference to the
required written denial. The opinion noted that some courts had required that the local authorities
issue formal findings of fact and conclusions of law.145 On the other hand, some courts had found
a written record of the meeting and a note that the application had been “denied” to suffice.146

141

Id. at 17 n.8 (citing to 47 U.S.C. §§ 332(c)(7)(B)(ii) and (B)(V), and to H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104458, at 209 (1996).
142

47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii).

143

SBA Communications, Inc. v. Zoning Comm’n of Town of Brookfield, 112 F.Supp.2d 233, 236
(D.Conn. 2000) (quoting Omnipoint Communications Enter., Inc. v. Town of Amherst, 74 F.Supp.2d 109,
122 (D.N.H. 1998).
144

244 F.3d 51 (1st Cir. 2001). In an extensive analysis, the Sixth Circuit found Todd “persuasive.”
New Par v. City of Saginaw, 301 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 2002).
145

Id. at 59 (citing, inter alia, Smart SMR of New York, Inc. v. The Zoning Commission of the Town
of Stratford, 995 F.Supp. 52, 56 (D.Conn. 1998); AT&T Wireless Servs. of Florida, Inc. v. Orange
County, 982 F.Supp. 856, 859 (M.D.Fla. 1997)).
146

Id. (citing AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City Council of Virginia Beach, 155 F.3d 423, 429 (4th
Cir.1998); AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. Winston-Salem Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 172 F.3d 307, 312-13
(4th Cir.1999).
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The First Circuit found that “[b]oth of these approaches seem flawed.”147 Todd held that the
Siting Policy “merely requires a written decision, in contrast to the Administrative Procedures
Act and other sections of the TCA that explicitly require formal findings of fact and conclusions
of law.”148 Furthermore, “[p]assage of the TCA did not alter the reality that the local boards that
administer the zoning laws are primarily staffed by laypeople. Though their decisions are now
subject to review under the TCA, it is not realistic to expect highly detailed findings of fact and
conclusions of law.”149 Yet issuance of a denial giving “no reasons for a decision” coupled with
the written record might be confusing, especially when the record contains assertions that might
be attributable to the board or only to individual members.150 “The TCA distinguishes between a
written denial and a written record, thus indicating that the record cannot be a substitute for a
separate denial.” 151
We conclude, therefore, that the TCA requires local boards to issue a written denial
separate from the written record. That written denial must contain a sufficient explanation
of the reasons for the permit denial to allow a reviewing court to evaluate the evidence in
the record supporting those reasons. We stress, however, that a meaningful review of the
decision is not limited, as Southwestern Bell would have it, only to the facts specifically
offered in the written decision. Again, such a requirement would place an unjustified
premium on the ability of a lay board to write a decision.152

Todd leaves open two important questions. The first is why the dual requirements for a
written denial and a written record precludes their incorporation into a single document. What if
the written denial contained no clear statement of reasons, but simply incorporated the written
record that did contain a clear statement of reasons? Under these facts, a District Court within the

147

Id. A noted regulatory takings lawyer has referred to such an analysis as “a Goldilocks and the
Three Bears sort of critique.” Michael M. Berger, Recent Takings and Eminent Domain Cases, C930
ALI-ABA 221, 230 (Aug. 17, 1994).
148

Id.

149

Id.

150

Id. at 60.

151

Id. (citing 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii)).
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First Circuit held, in Nextel Communications of Mid-Atlantic, Inc. v. Town of Sudbury, that “[t]o
reject the ZBA’s procedures on this ground would be a victory of form over substance.”153
6. “Supported by Substantial Evidence”
The most substantive aspect of the Siting Policy is the requirement that denials of permit
requests shall be “supported by substantial evidence contained in a written record.”154 As the
Eleventh Circuit noted in Preferred Sites, LLC v. Troup County,155 while Section 704 “does not
statutorily define the term ‘substantial evidence,’” the House-Senate Conference Committee
expressly noted that it is meant to be “‘the traditional standard used for judicial review of agency
actions.’”156 But what standard is that?
“Judicial review of agency actions” most directly brings to mind actions of administrative
agencies, hence administrative law. Applying the inference that Congress intends to use
undefined terms of art in their established meaning,157 many courts have presumed that Congress
intended “substantial evidence” to “track” the meaning of that term under the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA).158 The APA requires review for “substantial evidence” in cases of
adjudications and formal rulemaking by federal agencies.159 Under this approach, denials of
siting requests are subject to judicial oversight at a higher level of scrutiny than standard local

152

Id.

153

No. Civ.A. 01-11754-DPW, 2003 WL 543383 (D. Mass. Feb. 26, 2003).

154

47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii).

155

296 F.3d 1210, 1218 (11th Cir. 2002).

156

Id. at 1218 (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. 104-458, at 208, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124, at 223).

157

Preferred Sites, 296 F.3d at 1218 (citing McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 342
(1991) (so analyzing “seaman,” undefined in Jones Act).
158

Voice Stream PCS I, LLC v. City of Hillsboro, 301 F.Supp.2d 1251, 1256 (D. Or. 2004).

159

See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 37 n.79 (D.C. Cir.1976).
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zoning decisions in order to determine whether the denials were supported by substantial
evidence.160
Traditionally, the federal courts have taken an extremely deferential stance in reviewing
local zoning decisions, limiting the scope of inquiry to the constitutionality of the zoning
decision under a standard of rational review. Although Congress explicitly preserved
local zoning authority in all other respects over the siting of wireless facilities, the
method by which siting decisions are made is now subject to judicial oversight.
Therefore, denials subject to the TCA are reviewed by this court more closely than
standard local zoning decisions. Here, the issue is whether the denials were supported by
substantial evidence. * * * “Substantial evidence” means less than a preponderance, but
more than a mere scintilla of evidence. “It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”161

Among the U.S. Courts of Appeals adopting an APA analysis are those for the First,162
Second,163 Third,164 and Sixth165 Circuits. Also employing this standard, the Eleventh Circuit
noted in Preferred Sites, LLC v. Troup County166 that “[s]ubstantial evidence is more than a mere
scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.”167 Furthermore, “[a]lthough the ‘substantial evidence’ standard is not as
stringent as the preponderance of the evidence standard, it requires courts to take a harder look

160

SBA Communications, Inc. v. Zoning Comm’n of Town of Brookfield, 112 F.Supp.2d 233, 236 (D.
Conn. 2000) (citing Cellular Tel. Co. v. Town of Oyster Bay, 166 F.3d 490, 493 (2d Cir. 1999)).
161

Cellular Tel. Co. v. Town of Oyster Bay, 166 F.3d 490, 493 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Universal
Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951) (citations to Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452
U.S. 61, 68 (1981) and 47 U.S.C. §§ 332(c)(7)(A) and (B)(v) omitted).
162

Southwestern Bell Mobile Systems, Inc. v. Todd, 244 F.3d 51, 58 (1st Cir. 2001).

163

Cellular Tel. Co. v. Town of Oyster Bay, 166 F.3d 490, 494 (2d Cir.1999).

164

Omnipoint Corp. v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Pine Grove Twp., 181 F.3d 403, 407-408 (3rd Cir.

1999).
165

Telespectrum, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 227 F.3d 414, 423 (6th Cir.2000).

166

Preferred Sites, LLC v. Troup County, 296 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir. 2002).

167

Id. at 1218 (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).
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than when reviewing under the arbitrary and capricious standard.”168 In evaluating whether the
standard is met, “a court should view the record in its entirety, including evidence unfavorable to
the state or local government’s decision.”169
Another approach is that embodied in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit’s
opinion in AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City Council of Virginia Beach.170 The wireless provider
and a church claimed that the denial of a conditional use permit to construct two 135-foot towers
on church land in a heavily forested residential area violated the Siting Policy. The planning
commission unanimously (with one abstention) voted to recommend approval of the permit after
hearings, but the city council received a petition against it from 700 landowners and
unanimously turned it down.171 The Fourth Circuit held that the U.S. District Court had been in
error when it when it concluded that the city counsel’s decision must include “findings of fact
and an explanation of the decision.172 While the Siting Policy demanded that decisions be in
writing, that “cannot reasonably be inflated into a requirement of a ‘statement of ... findings and
conclusions, and the reasons or basis therefor,’” as the explicit requirements of the APA
dictate.173
More fundamentally, however, the Fourth Circuit disagreed substantive view that the city
council should be held to the same standard as an administrative agency. Instead, it adopted a
“reasonable legislator” test:
The Virginia Beach City Council is a state legislative body, not a federal administrative
agency. The “reasonable mind” of a legislator is not necessarily the same as the
“reasonable mind” of a bureaucrat, and one should keep the distinction in mind when

168

Id. (citing Color Pigments Mfrs. Ass’n, Inc. v. OSHA, 16 F.3d 1157, 1160 (11th Cir.1994)).

169

Id. (citing Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 523 (1981).

170

155 F.3d 423 (4th Cir. 1998).

171

Id. at 425. See supra text accompanying note 68.

172

Id. at 429.

173

Id. at 429-430 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 557(c)).
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attempting to impose the “substantial evidence” standard onto the world of legislative
decisions. It is not only proper but even expected that a legislature and its members will
consider the views of their constituents to be particularly compelling forms of evidence,
in zoning as in all other legislative matters. These views, if widely shared, will often
trump those of bureaucrats or experts in the minds of reasonable legislators.
In light of these principles, the City Council’s decision clearly does not violate the
“substantial evidence” requirement. . . . Appellees correctly point out that both the
Planning Department and the Planning Commission recommended approval. In addition,
appellees of course had numerous experts touting both the necessity and the minimal
impact of towers at the Church. Such evidence surely would have justified a reasonable
legislator in voting to approve the application, and may even amount to a preponderance
of the evidence in favor of the application, but the repeated and widespread opposition of
a majority of the citizens of Virginia Beach who voiced their views--at the Planning
Commission hearing, through petitions, through letters, and at the City Council meeting-amounts to far more than a “mere scintilla” of evidence to persuade a reasonable mind to
oppose the application. Indeed, we should wonder at a legislator who ignored such
opposition. In all cases of this sort, those seeking to build will come armed with exhibits,
experts, and evaluations. Appellees, by urging us to hold that such a predictable barrage
mandates that local governments approve applications, effectively demand that we
interpret the Act so as always to thwart average, nonexpert citizens; that is, to thwart
democracy. The district court dismissed citizen opposition as “generalized concerns.”
Congress, in refusing to abolish local authority over zoning of personal wireless services,
categorically rejected this scornful approach.174

Going beyond the Fourth Circuit preference for local autonomy, Judge Paul Niemeyer’s
concurring opinion in Petersburg Cellular Partnership v. Board of Supervisors of Nottoway
County175 asserted that the Siting Policy “substantial evidence” test violates the Tenth
Amendment.176 Judge Niemeyer noted that the Supremacy clause of the U.S. Constitution177
requires state courts to apply federal law.178 “But the requirement that state courts apply federal
law is materially different from the proposition that state zoning boards use federally mandated

174

Id. at 430-431 (emphasis added).

175

205 F.3d 688 (4th Cir. 2000)

176

Id. at 699-705 (Niemeyer, J., concurring).

177

U.S. CONST. Art. VI, cl. 2.
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standards in their legislative processes.”179 Furthermore, “the imposition of a federal standard on
a local board confuses the electorate as to which governmental unit, federal or local, is to be
accountable for a legislative decision made by the local board.”180 The Fourth Circuit view might
dispel at least some of the concern of those commentators who thought that the Siting Policy
might subsume all local autonomy.181
While the Fourth Circuit test and Niemeyer concurrence stress local legislative
autonomy, courts applying the APA “substantial evidence” test presume that local land use
regulation is a quasi-judicial function. The Third Circuit quoted the Fourth Circuit’s AT&T
Wireless182 language celebrating legislative autonomy in Omnipoint Corp. v. Zoning Hearing
Board of Pine Grove Township.183 It continued by quoting approvingly from the Seventh
Circuit’s opinion in Aegerter v. City of Delafield184which, the Third Circuit said, “characterized
zoning permit decisions as primarily administrative in nature.”185 The Seventh Circuit had
declared:
[T]rue as the AT & T Wireless observation may be about legislators, it overlooks the fact
that municipal councils often wear several hats when they act. When they are passing

178

205 F.3d at 704 (Niemeyer, J., concurring).

179

Id. (emphasis in original).

180

Id. at 700 (Niemeyer, J., concurring).

181

See, e.g., Matthew N. McClure, Comment, Working Through the Static: Is There Anything Left to
Local Control in the Siting of Cellular and PCS Towers After the Telecommunications Act of 1996?, 44
VILL. L. REV. 781, 786 (1999).
182

AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City Council of Virginia Beach, 155 F.3d 423 (4th Cir. 1998). “The
Virginia Beach City Council is a state legislative body, not a federal administrative agency.... It is not
only proper but even expected that a legislature and its members will consider the views of their
constituents to be particularly compelling forms of evidence, in zoning as in all other legislative matters.
These views, if widely shared, will often trump those of bureaucrats or experts in the minds of reasonable
legis lators.” Id. at 430. For a longer excerpt, see supra text accompanying note 174.
183

181 F.3d 403, 408 (3rd Cir. 1999).

184

174 F.3d 886 (7th Cir.1999).

185

181 F.3d at 408.
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ordinances or other laws, they are without a doubt legislators, but when they sit as an
administrative body making decisions about zoning permits, they are like any other
agency the state has created. We therefore apply the conventional substantial evidence
standard to the case before us.186

For land use aficionados, the debate as to whether the authorization of wireless
communications towers by local legislatures is quasi-judicial or legislative in nature is but one
reflection of the controversy concerning the standards by which small-scale rezoning of any sort
is to be adjudicated. Insofar as the U.S. Constitution is concerned, the comprehensive zoning of a
community has been legislative in nature, and thus entitled to deference, since the seminal case
of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.187 On the other extreme, the exaction of property in exchange for
the issuance of development permits by local administrative agencies is subject to the
requirements that the exaction be imposed upon an individualized determination that it is roughly
proportional to the burden that would be imposed by the new land use.188 The Supreme Court has
shied away from imposing the same test on local legislative determinations, although it is not
clear if there is any basis for a distinction between administrative and legislative determinations
for Fifth Amendment Takings Clause purposes.189 There is state precedent stating that legislative
small-scale exactions violate the Takings Clause.190
The states, for the most part, have deemed all zoning, even small-scale rezoning, to be a
legislative function.191 However, some states, primarily out of concern with the abuses generally
associated with “spot zoning,” treat small-scale land use planning enactments as “quasi-judicial”

186

174 F.3d at 889

187

272 U.S. 365 (1926).

188

Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).

189

See Parking Ass’n of Ga. v. City of Atlanta, 515 U.S. 1116, 1116 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari).
190

Amoco Oil Co. v. Village of Schaumburg, 661 N.E.2d 380 (Ill. App. 1995), appeal denied, 667
N.E.2d 1055 (Ill. 1996) (table).
191

See, e.g., Arnel Dev. Co. v. City of Costa Mesa, 620 P.2d 565 (Cal. 1980); South Gwinett Venture
v. Pruitt, 491 F.2d 5 (5th Cir.); Mahoney v. O’Shea Funeral Homes, Inc., 380 N.E.2d 297 (N.Y. 1978).

Draft of 9/3/2004

Please do not cite or quote without permission.

Eagle, Wireless Telecommunications, Infrastructure Security, and the NIMBY Problem

37

or “administrative” under some circumstances. In Fasano v. Board of Commissioners of
Washington County,192 the Supreme Court of Oregon declared:
[W]e feel we would be ignoring reality to rigidly view all zoning decisions by local
gov erning bodies as legislative acts to be accorded a full presumption of validity and
shielded from less than constitutional scrutiny by the theory of separation of powers.
Local and small decision groups are simply not the equivalent in all respects of state and
national legislatures. There is a growing judicial recognition of this fact of life: “It is not
a part of the legislative function to grant permits, make special exceptions, or decide
particular cases. Such activities are not legislative but administrative, quasi-judicial, or
judicial in character. To place them in the hands of legislative bodies, whose acts as such
are not judicially reviewable, is to open the door completely to arbitrary government.” . .
.193

Interestingly, even precedent within a given State might be torn between the desire to
protect the almost-plenary authority on land use matters accorded local legislatures on the one
hand, and the graft and abuse often associated with spot zoning on the other. Virginia is a
germane case in point. The Fourth Circuit, in establishing its “reasonable legislator” rule in
AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City Council of Virginia Beach,194 stressed the importance of the
legislative function. Similarly, in his concurring opinion in Petersburg Cellular Partnership v.
Board of Supervisors of Nottoway County,195 Judge Niemeyer quoted a 1975 Virginia Supreme
Court decision in City of Richmond v. Randall,196 which the Virginia court subsequently
reaffirmed,197 stressing that “the courts have ‘no power to rezone land to any classification or to

192

507 P.2d 23 (Or. 1973), disapproved of on other grounds, Neuberger v. City of Portland, 607 P.2d
722 (Or. 1980); superseded by statute, Menges v. Board of County Comm’rs of Jackson County, 606 P.2d
681 (Ore. App. 1980).
193

Id. at 26 (citations omitted).

194

155 F.3d 423 (4th Cir. 1998).

195

205 F.3d 688 (4th Cir. 2000)

196

554 S.E.2d 56 (Va. 1975).

197

Tran v. Gwinn, 554 S.E.2d 63, 69 (Va. 2001) (citing Randall).
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order a legislative body to do so.’”198 At the very same time, there is a clear line of cases in
Virginia prohibiting local legislatures from engaging in small-scale rezoning unless there is a
demonstrable mistake in the original comprehensive zoning or change in circumstances.199
“With respect to the validity of a piecemeal downzoning ordinance such as that here
involved, we are of opinion that when an aggrieved landowner makes a prima facie
showing that since enactment of the prior ordinance there has been no change in
circumstances substantially affecting the public health, safety, or welfare, the burden of
going forward with evidence of such mistake, fraud, or changed circumstances shifts to
the governing body. If the governing body produces evidence sufficient to make
reasonableness fairly debatable, the ordinance must be sustained. If not, the ordinance is
unreasonable and void. . . . .”200

The import of these Virginia cases is that comprehensive zoning is the prerogative of the
local legislature, whereas small-scale rezoning, often condemned as “spot zoning,” will be more
carefully reviewed by the courts. In a sense, the problem elucidated in Judge Niemeyer’s
Nottoway concurrence,201 asserting that the TCA “substantial evidence” test violates the Tenth
Amendment,202 is not unlike that wrestled with some courts as to whether to apply the Fasano
distinction,203 permitting legislatures to act as legislatures most of the time, but insisting that they
act as administrative tribunals at other.

204

The judicial split over the “substantial evidence” test is emblematic of the recursive
character of the TCA siting provisions. Those Circuits favoring APA position have said that
“[s]ubstantial evidence review under the TCA does not create a substantive federal limitation

198

205 F.3d at 700 (Niemeyer, J., concurring) (quoting Randall, 211 S.E.2d at 61).

199

See, e.g., Seabrooke Partners v. City of Chesapeake, 393 S.E.2d 191 (Va. 1990);

200

Turner v. Bd. of County Sup’rs of Pr. William County, 559 S.E.2d 683, 687 (Va. 2002) (quoting
Board of Sup’rs of Fairfax County v. Snell, 202 S.E.2d 889, 893 (Va. 1974).
201

Petersburg Cellular Partnership v. Bd. of Sup’rs of Nottoway County, 205 F.3d 688 (4th Cir. 2000).

202

Id. at 699-705 (Niemeyer, J., concurring).

203

Fasano v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Washington County, 507 P.2d 23 (Or. 1973).
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upon local land use regulatory power.”205 Likewise, the substantive standard, to which the
“substantial evidence” inquiry is directed, is taken from “established principles of state and local
law.”206 Thus, Federal law specifies the degree or quantum of evidence needed to legitimize,
under federal law, the exercise of legislative powers, devolved upon local boards, under state
law, to enforce substance rights established, by state law.
The application of the APA test to Section 704 has been criticized because its preference
for formal fact finding and objective evidence “prevents a [local] board from balancing properly
a proposed tower’s potential harm and the utility of improved wireless services.”207 In addition to
aesthetics and potential effects on property values not being easily reducible to empirical data,
the argument has it, “courts applying the APA test preclude a board from relying on residents’
opinions in deciding whether to grant a tower siting permit.”208
The notion that the data of experts was to be preferred over the feelings of people was
rejected by the Fourth Circuit in the AT & T Wireless Virginia Beach case.209 “Congress, in
refusing to abolish local authority over zoning of personal wireless services, categorically
rejected this scornful approach.”210

204

See, e.g., Board of County Commissioners of Brevard County v. Snyder, 627 So. 2d 469 (Fla.
1993); Martin County v. Yusem, 690 So.2d 1288 (Fla. 1997).
205

Southwestern Bell Mobile Sys., Inc. v. Todd, 244 F.3d 51, 58 (1st Cir. 2001) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
206

Preferred Sites, LLC v. Troup County, 296 F.3d 1210, 1219 (11th Cir.2002) (quoting Cellular Tel.
Co. v. Town of Oyster Bay, 166 F.3d 490, 494 (2nd Cir. 1999), quoting in turn, (quoting Cellular Tel.
Co. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 24 F.Supp.2d 359, 366 (D. N.J. 1998)).
207

Christopher P. Terry, On the Frontiers of Knowledge: A Flexible Substantial Evidence Standard of
Review for Zoning Board Tower Siting Decisions, 20 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 147, 156 (2002).
208

Id.

209

AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City Council of Virginia Beach, 155 F.3d 423, 430 (4th Cir. 1998)
(legislators will “consider the views of their constituents to be particularly compelling forms of
evidence”).
210

Id. at 431.
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More broadly, the concern that data unfairly overcomes intuitions permeates the
controversy over the employment of cost-benefit analysis, which has become a standard tool for
discerning the efficacy of regulatory policy.211 Some assert that the methodology of cost-benefit
analysis is flawed because of problems involving the incommensurability of different values,
including hedonic values; consequentialist ethics; appropriate discount rates (if any) for future
enjoyment of resources; distributional issues, which center around whether willingness to pay is
the appropriate proxy of demand; and survey and measurement errors.212 With respect to the
environment, often raised in the tower citing context, deep ecologists have rejected the use of
cost-benefit analysis in toto.213
Assertions about environmental values and the value of the environment are expressed
with considerable conviction. Aesthetic and other claims based on the enjoyment of nature by
present and future generations are not falsifiable, hence not scientific in nature,214 and hence not
amenable to rigorous judicial review. That notwithstanding, courts applying the APA approach
have vindicated aesthetic objections to tower siting, even when the objections are not supported
by declines in market value. It is sufficient that the decision seems grounded in objections to the
particular tower.215 On the other hand, courts have not been supportive of articulated negative
views about towers in general or that evidenced a misunderstanding of what the tower actually

211

See, e.g., Jason Scott Johnston, A Game Theoretic Analysis of Alternative Institutions for
Regulatory Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1343 (2002) (discussing growth of cost-benefit
analysis).
212

See generally, Robert H. Frank, Why Is Cost-Benefit Analysis So Controversial?, 29 J. LEGAL
STUD. 913 (2000).
213

Edwin R. McCullough, Through the Eye of a Needle: The Earth’s Hard Passage Back to Health,
10 J. Envtl. L. & Litig. 389 (1995) “If access to nature is a right, then cost-benefit analysis breaks down.
In other words, there is no amount of money which can compensate for irreversible and irreparable
damage to nature.” Id. at 436-437.
214

See KARL R. POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS: THE GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC
KNOWLEDGE 33-59 (3d ed. 1969).
215

Southwestern Bell Mobile Systems, Inc. v. Todd, 244 F.3d 51, 61 (1st Cir. 2001).
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would look like.216 Nor have the courts supported aesthetic objections that were demonstrably
without substance.217
7. No Regulation Based on “Radio Frequency Emissions”
The Siting Policy prohibits states and localities from denying wireless tower siting
permits for environmental reasons based on radio frequency emissions that comply with FCC
standards.218 The Siting Policy therefore precludes “health concerns from radio emissions.”219
Furthermore, local attempts to regulate the “operation” of wireless communications towers,
based on emissions considerations, also were reasonably interpreted by the FCC to fall under the
same prohibition.220 While the Siting Policy emissions provision mentions “placement,
construction, and modification,” but not operations, it is only in the area of “placement,
construction, and modification” that the TCA makes an exception to its general preference for
plenary FCC rulemaking.221 However, a public entity can refuse to license or otherwise permit
the construction of a communications tower on its own property based on health concerns. The
denial then would be proprietary rather than regulatory in nature.222

216

Cellular Tel. Co. v. Town of Oyster Bay, 166 F.3d 490 (2nd Cir. 1999).

217

See Omnipoint Corp. v. Zoning Hearing Board of Pine Grove Township, 181 F.3d 403, 406 (3rd
Cir. 1999) (noting that 114-foot tower was surrounded by 80 to 90-foot tall trees and would only be
visible to neighbors 600 feet away).
218

No State or local government or instrumentality thereof may regulate the placement, construction,
and modification of personal wireless service facilities on the basis of the environmental effects of radio
frequency emissions to the extent that such facilities comply with the Commission’s regulations
concerning such emissions.
219

AT & T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City Council of City of Virginia Beach, 155 F.3d 423, 431 n. 6 (4th
Cir.1998).
220

Cellular Phone Taskforce v. FCC, 205 F.3d 82, 95-96 (2nd Cir. 2000) (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc.
V. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.11, 844 (1984) (requiring deferential
review of agency construction of statute it is charged with administrating).
221

Id.

222

See Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. Mills, 283 F.2d 404 (2nd Cir. 2002).
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8. Expedited Review and Relief
Section 704 provides that persons directly affected by state or local wireless tower
permitting decisions, or failure to act, may seek expedited review in federal or state court.223 It
has been interpreted to vest U.S. district courts with sufficient authority to grant mandamus relief
if such relief is warranted under the circumstances.224 In light of the requirement for such
expedition, courts finding for the telecommunications provider generally order the issuance of
the requested permit rather than remand for additional proceedings. Such a remand “would
simply further delay resolution of the issue.”225 There is a substantial split among the courts as to
whether landowners and wireless providers may seek relief under the federal Civil Rights Act
(Section 1983).226
However, the TCA
’ s provision of a right of action for wireless telephone providers
denied permission to locate transmission towers in desired locations, did not provide right of
action to persons aggrieved by decision to allow towers.227

223

47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v). “Any person adversely affected by any final action or failure to act by
a State or local government or any instrumentality thereof that is inconsistent with this subparagraph may,
within 30 days after such action or failure to act, commence an action in any court of competent
jurisdiction. The court shall hear and decide such action on an expedited basis. Any person adversely
affected by an act or failure to act by a State or local government or any instrumentality thereof that is
inconsistent with clause (iv) [environmental effects of radio frequency omissions] may petition the
Commission for relief.” Id.
224

Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. Jefferson County, 968 F.Supp. 1457 (N.D. Ala. 1997).

225

Primeco Personal Communications v. City of Mequon, 242 F.Supp.2d 567, 582 (E.D. Wis. 2003).

226

See, e.g., Omnipoint Communications, Inc. v. City of White Plains, 175 F.Supp.2d 697, 707
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (yes); SBA Comm. Inc. v. Zoning Comm’n of the Town of Franklin, 164 F.Supp.2d 280,
294-295 (D.Conn. 2001) (same); Primeco Personal Communications v. City of Mequon, 242 F.Supp.2d
567 (E.D. Wis. 2003) (no); Quest Corp. v. City of Santa Fe, New Mexico, 224 F.Supp.2d 1305 (D.N.M.
2002) (same).
227

Mason v. O’Brien, 2002 WL 31972190 (N.D.N.Y. 2002) (not reported in F.Supp.2d).
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C. Should the Williamson County Ripeness Rules Apply to Section 704 Cases?
1. The Supreme Court’s Williamson County Test
In the seminal case of Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton
Bank,228 the Supreme Court reviewed the claim that denial of permits for residential development
constituted a taking for which just compensation was required under the Fifth Amendment.229
The Court

held that the developer “has not shown that the [state] inverse condemnation

procedure is unavailable or inadequate, and until it has utilized that procedure, its taking claim is
premature.”230
The result of Williamson County has been that regulatory takings cases are subject to “a
special ripeness doctrine applicable only to constitutional property rights claims.”231 The
Williamson County test has two prongs. The first provides that “a claim that the application of
government regulations effects a taking of a property interest is not ripe until the government
entity charged with implementing the regulations has reached a final decision regarding the
application of the regulations to the property at issue.”232 The second prong requires that the
owner seek just compensation in sate courts.233

228

473 U.S. 172 (1985). Williamson County also contains a second test. here the property owner
alleges that the governmental action constituted a taking.
229

U.S. CONST. amend. V (“nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation”).
230

473 U.S. at 197.

231

Timothy V. Kassouni, The Ripeness Doctrine and the Judicial Relegation of Constitutionally
Protected Property Rights , 29 CAL. W. L. REV. 1, 2 (1992).
232

Id. at 186.

233

Id. at 194-195. The owner must “seek compensation through the procedures the State has provided
for doing so.”
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1. Should Williamson County Apply to TCA Determinations ?
Section 704 explicitly provides that aggrieved parties can challenge state and local
wireless communications tower siting determination in federal court.234 Thus, it might seem that
Williamson County is not a bar to federal judicial review. However, the right to sue is triggered
by a “final action or failure to act.”235 Therefore, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit recently determined, in Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. City of Carmel,236 that the “final
decision” prong of Williamson County is applicable to TCA siting challenges.
In one sense, it is no surprise that the Seventh Circuit’s Carmel opinion discerns “no
significant difference” between the evolution of the regulatory takings ripeness doctrine in
Williamson County and its progeny and the application of the doctrine to telecommunications
tower siting. As the court noted, Seventh Circuit precedent indeed has “read Williamson
broadly,”237 excepting from its purview only land use cases involving equal protection claims
involving fundamental rights, a suspect class, or demonstrated governmental conduct impossible
to reconcile with legitimate objectives.238 Emblematic of its approach was the brush-off of one
owner’s claim that land use regulations violated the Fourteenth Amendment with the sentence:
“This case presents a garden-variety zoning dispute dressed up in the trappings of constitutional
law.”239

234

47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v) (“Any person adversely affected by any final action or failure to act by
a State or local government . . . that is inconsistent with this subparagraph may, within 30 days after such
action or failure to act, commence an action in any court of competent jurisdiction. . . .”)
235

Id.

236

361 F.3d 998 (7th Cir. 2004).

237

City of Carmel, 361 F.3d at 1002 (quoting Forseth v. Village of Sussex, 199 F.3d 363, 370 (7th
Cir.2000)).
238

Id.

239

Coniston Corp. v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 467 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding rejection
of site plan not deprivation of substantive or procedural due process).
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Sprint, a national provider of wireless telephone services, sought to improve its service in
the Indianapolis area by leasing the right to place an antenna on the land of Dr. Edwin Zamber, a
city resident. “Carmel is just a stone’s throw north of Indianapolis, and Zamber already had an
existing 135-foot-high ham radio tower on his property which met Sprint’s technical
requirements.”240 Sprint received an improvement location permit from Carmel, allowing it to
install low-profile antennae on the sides of Zamber’s tower and to construct a ground-level
equipment shelter. A neighbor objected and Carmel revoked the permit on the grounds that the
access road that Sprint was installing required an access easement and subdivision and primary
plat amendments.241 After a state court found Sprint’s subdivision appeal timely, and having held
multiple hearings, the Board of Zoning Appeals determined that a commercial antenna was not a
permitted use in the residential district, and that Sprint would have to obtain a special use permit,
as well as subdivision plat approval from the Plan Commission.242 Sprint then sought mandamus
and other relief in federal court claiming, inter alia, that the BZA’s actions violated the Siting
Policy, since they were not supported by substantial evidence and unreasonably discriminated
against Sprint.243 The trial court, noting that Sprint still could apply for a special use permit,
dismissed the case under the “final decision” rule of Williamson County.”244
The Seventh Circuit began by noting that Carmel concerned one Section 704 issue,
“when is a land use decision a ‘final action’ in order to create federal subject matter jurisdiction.
Specifically, we must examine whether the Act modifies the traditional analysis, enunciated in
Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank, for determining when a
complaint challenging a local land use decision is ripe for federal adjudication.”245 Section 704

240

361 F.3d at 1000.

241

Id.

242

Id.

243

Id.

244

Id. at 1001.

245

Id. at 1000 (citing Williamson County, 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
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provides that “an action can be brought in ‘any court of competent jurisdiction’ by ‘[a]ny person
adversely affected by any final action or failure by a State or local government or any
instrumentality thereof that is inconsistent with [§332(c)(7)] ....’”246 It added that “[t]he normal
rule of statutory construction is that if Congress intends for legislation to change the
interpretation of a judicially created concept, it makes that intent specific.”247 The court added
that “the existence of a case and controversy is a prerequisite for the exercise of federal judicial
power” and that “[t]he [ripeness] doctrine’s basic rationale ‘is to prevent the courts, through
avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over
administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from judicial interference until an
administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the
challenging parties.’”248
“Based on these principles, the Supreme Court has adopted [the Williamson County]
specific ripeness requirements for cases challenging land use decisions.”249 “Noticeably,” the
court added, “with regard to challenges to land use decisions, ‘[t]his Circuit has read Williamson
broadly ....’”250 “[W]e see no significant difference simply because Sprint’s claim arises from a
statute rather than the Constitution.
The Seventh Circuit recognized that the Williamson County ripeness rules are not the
“more general” ripeness standards, nor are they the same as the specific ripeness standards
specified by other statutes.251 It grounded its decision to use the Williamson County rules in the
TCA
’ s statutory provisions and legislative intent.

246

47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v) (brackets and emphasis by Seventh Circuit).

247

361 F.3d at 1001 (quoting Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. N.J. Dep’t of E.P., 474 U.S. 494, 501 (1986)
(internal citation omitted)).
248

Id. at 1002 (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967)).

249

Id.

250

Id. (quoting Forseth v. Village of Sussex, 199 F.3d 363, 370 (7th Cir.2000)).

251

Id. at 1003.
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. . . although creating a federal cause of action, Congress explicitly ensured that the Act
would not intrude upon the traditional authority of local governments over land use
matters. As codified, § 332(c)(7) is entitled “Preservation of local zoning authority.” That
section expressly states that “[e]xcept as provided in this paragraph, nothing in [the] Act
shall limit or affect the authority of a State or local government or instrumentality thereof
over decisions regarding the placement, construction, and modification of personal
wireless service facilities.”252

The court then noted that the original House provision would have allowed the FCC total
authority over tower siting, but that the final bill, as the Conference Committee explained,
preserves the authority of State and local governments over zoning and land use matters except
in the limited circumstances set forth in the conference agreement.”253 Furthermore, the
Conference Committee’s report defined “final action” as meaning “final administrative action at
the State or local government level so that a party can commence action under the [Act] rather
than waiting for the exhaustion of any independent State court remedy otherwise required.”254
Sprint asserted that reading Williamson County into the TCA “would create too many
time-consuming procedural hurdles,” thus defeating the Act’s intent of encouraging the “rapid
deployment” of wireless communications.255 This intent is furthered by three other provisions of
the Act; that local authorities act on siting requests within a “reasonable period of time,”256 that
providers must file claims under the Act within 30 days,257 and that the federal courts hear such
claims on an expedited basis.258 Based on these, Sprint urged that the TCA’s requirement for

252

Id.

253

Id. (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-458, at 207 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124, 221-

254

Id. (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-458, at 9 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124, 223.)

255

Id. (citing 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(3)(A)).

256

Id. (citing 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii)).

257

Id. (citing 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii)).

258

Id. (citing 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v)).

22.
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“final action” requires only that the service provider “obtain a definitive ruling from the local
government sole on the issues presented to the local authorities.”259
The court disagreed, based upon its conclusion that Congress “did not intend to modify
the traditional ripeness requirements for challenging local land use decisions” embodied in
Williamson County.260 The court added that, while Williamson County requires that an owner
“must exhaust all available state remedies for compensation prior to bringing taking claim to
federal court,”261 the Conference Committee interpreted “final action” under the TCA siting
provisions as meaning “final administrative action at the State or local government level so that a
party can commence action under the [Act] rather than waiting for the exhaustion of any
independent State court remedy otherwise required.”262 “This exercise,” it added, “clearly
teaches that Congress was aware of Williamson County and knew how to modify its holding
when that is what it wanted to do.”263
The second (state compensation) prong of Williamson County requires that the landowner
litigate for compensation up through the state supreme court, if permitted to do so.264 The reason
is that “if a State provides an adequate procedure for seeking just compensation, the property
owner cannot claim a violation of the Just Compensation Clause until it has used the procedure
and been denied just compensation.”265 The first (finality) prong of Williamson County provides
that “a claim that the application of government regulations effects a taking of a property interest

259

Id.

260

Id.

261

Id. at 1004 (citing Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 193-194).

262

Id (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-458, at 9 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124, 223
(brackets by the court).
263

Id.

264

Williamson County, 473 U.S. 172, 194 (“A second reason the taking claim is not yet ripe is that
respondent did not seek compensation through the procedures the State has provided for doing so”).
265

Id. at 195.
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is not ripe until the government entity charged with implementing the regulations has reached a
final decision regarding the application of the regulations to the property at issue.”266 Although at
least one state, California, requires judicial review of administrative determinations for finality
ripeness,267 it is not clear if that applies beyond inverse condemnation claims.
Read with this caveat in mind, the sparse language of the Conference Committee report
could mean either that (1) Congress was precluding what generally would be the expansion of
Williamson County to include state litigation of local land use decisions as well as local denials
of compensation, or (2) that Congress was evincing its general concern that local land use
decisions be expedited. The failure of the Conference Committee report to make explicit
reference to Williamson County suggests that the second interpretation is more accurate.
2. The Convolution of Williamson County Subprongs
The invocation of the beguiling word “finality” masks a multitude of complexities. First,
it is not in the local land use regulator’s interest to give the “final” determination that would
satisfy the Williamson County finality requirement. As Justice Brennan noted in his seminal
dissent in San Diego Gas & Electric Company v. City of San Diego,268 regulators employ delay
as an administrative tool precisely to thwart development.269 Second, given the multitude of
incommensurate variables that enter into a planning decision, the very concept of a “final”
determination that a specified quantity of development would be allowed is alien to the planning
process.
What is supposedly needed is a “final” determination of what the regulator will allow the
property owner to do on his land. As most planners will tell you, however, that is not a
planner’s job. The planner’s job is to draw an abstract plan and then determine whether a

266

Id. at 186 (emphasis added).

267

Hensler v. City of Glendale, 876 P.2d 1043 (Cal. 1994).

268

450 U.S. 621, 655 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).

269

Id. at 655 & n.22 (noting that city attorneys were advised at a training program that, “IF ALL ELSE
FAILS, MERELY AMEND THE REGULATION AND START OVER AGAIN”) (capitalization in
original).
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specific development proposal meets its requirements. Anyone who thinks that he can get
a planning agency to formally tell him what he CAN do on his land simply doesn’t
understand the planning process.270

Furthermore, in the face of the reluctance of officials to issue “final denials” in place of
invitations to try and try again, attempts to make operational the fuzzy concept of “finality” have
become increasingly convoluted. In fact, in spite of its use of the term “premature” in Williamson
County,271 the Supreme Court has never definitively ruled that there is a right, after state
adjudication, to federal review of Fifth Amendment takings claims.272 Furthermore, the Courts of
Appeals are divided as to whether the act of “ripening” a claim in state court itself creates issue
and claim preclusion so as to defeat any subsequent federal judicial review.273
A development application under Williamson County must be “meaningful.” The year
after Williamson County was decided, the Supreme Court, in MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v.
Yolo County,274 declared:
It follows from the nature of a regulatory takings claim that an essential prerequisite to its
assertion is a final and authoritative determination of the type and intensity of
development legally permitted on the subject property. A court cannot determine whether
a regulation has gone “too far” unless it knows how far the regulation goes.275

270

Michael M. Berger, Validating the Rights of Private Land Development in the Courts, 32 URB.
LAW. 941, 954 (2000) (emphasis in original).
271

Williamson County, 473 U.S. 172, 197 (1985).

272

See, e.g., Rainey Bros. Construction Co. v. Memphis and Shelby County Bd. of Adjustment, 528
U.S. 871 (1999) (denying certiorari on this issue, although petition filed by leading advocates for both
landowners and municipalities).
273

See, e.g., San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and County of San Francisco, 364 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2004)
(barring subsequent federal review); Wilkinson v. Pitkin County Bd. of Comm’rs, 142 F.3d 1319 (10th
Cir. 1998) (same); Santini v. Connecticut Hazardous Waste Mgmt. Serv., 342 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2003)
(permitting subsequent federal review); Fields v. Sarasota Manatee Airport Auth., 953 F.2d 1299 (11th
Cir. 1992) (same)).
274

477 U.S. 340 (1986).

275

Id. at 348.
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Referring to the developer’s permit application, the Court added in MacDonald that the
“[r]ejection of exceedingly grandiose development plans does not logically imply that less
ambitious plans will receive similarly unfavorable reviews.”276 “The implication is not that
future applications would be futile, but that a meaningful application has not yet been made.”277
A wireless facilities siting application for a conditional use, variance, or other permit might,
similarly, be rejected on the grounds that the tower is too tall, to stark in design, too close to
incompatible uses, or otherwise so blatantly violative of local norms so as not to be “meaningful”
under Williamson County and, hence, under the Siting Policy. The ex ante effect of the
“meaningful” application requirement is that the applicant’s first proposal often is treated as the
initial offer in a round of negotiations, and, necessarily, the applicant must submit it with that
knowledge.
Some courts have required that the owner apply for a variance under all circumstances.278
This is not a procedure apt to prove fruitful to applicants, however, since use variances require
that the parcel was such that any owner would suffer unique hardship without relief, and also that
there would be no injury from the intended use to neighbors.279
One defense from onerous demands for multiple applications is the doctrine of
“futility.”280 The Supreme Court recently defined “futility” in a practical sense in Palazzolo v.
Rhode Island,281, noting that “once . . . the permissible uses of the property are known to a

276

Id. at 353 n.9.

277

Id. at 353 n.8.

278

See, e.g., Lake Nacimiento Ranch Co. v. County of San Luis Obispo, 841 F.2d 872, 877 (9th Cir.
1988).
279

See, e.g., Otto v. Steinhilber, 24 N.E.2d 851 (N.Y. 1939).

280

See, e.g., Greenbriar v. City of Alabaster, 881 F.2d 1570 (11th Cir. 1989) (parties agreed that
property could not be developed more extensively); Herrington v. County of Sonoma, 834 F.2d 1488 (9th
Cir. 1987) (preliminary ruling having effect of precluding development made pursuit of application
futile).
281

533 U.S. 606 (2001).
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reasonable degree of certainty, a takings claim is likely to have ripened.”282 Classic examples of
futility tend to involve bad faith as well. In City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey,
Ltd.,283 the city demanded five complete site plans for a proposed development. Each time the
landowner complied with the city’s articulated recommendations for change, the city refused to
take “yes” for an answer and piled on new demands. The patent incredulity with which the
justices viewed the city’s assurance that matters were complicated and that all applicants were
treated in the manner as Del Monte Dunes undoubtedly played an important, if unarticulated,
role in the Court’s upholding a substantial award for the landowner.284
In Town of Amherst v. Omnipoint Communications Enterprises, Inc.,285 the First Circuit
chastised the locality that it must “face reality”:
If the Board’s position is that it can just sit back and deny all applications, that
position in the end could, if maintained, prove fatal to the Board rather than
Omnipoint. Under federal law, the town can control the siting of facilities but–as
several Board members admitted–it cannot preclude wireless service altogether.
Nor, in the face of a vigilant district court, can the town exhaust applicants by
requiring successive applications without giving any clue of what will do the
trick.286

282

Id. at 620.

283

526 U.S. 687, 721 (1999) (requirement of exhausting available postdeprivation remedies under
United States law).
284

City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., Official Transcript, October 7, 1998, 1998
WL 721087. “This case is not atypical in some respects. The city was faced with a complex decision it
had to reconcile competing interests, sift through facts, and exercise its discretion and judgment, and it
did so.” Id. at *3 (George A. Yuhas, for Petitioner). * * * “The Court [Justice Scalia, referring to the
number of complete applications the city required, each imposing additional demands]: Five times.” Id.
285

173 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 1999).

286

Id. at 16-17.
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3. The Williamson County Rule and Expedited Review
There is an extensive literature devoted to parsing the complexities of the Williamson
County rule,287 and whether federal takings questions should be decided in federal courts.288
According to Professor Daniel R. Mandelker, “federal judges have distorted the Supreme Court’s
ripeness precedents to achieve an undeserved and unwarranted result: they avoid the vast
majority of takings cases on their merits.”289
This provenance makes the Williamson County doctrine a notably problematic where a
statute mandates expedited review.
D. Evaluating the TCA Siting Provisions
The present TCA facilities siting provisions have led to “costly battles” between unhappy
neighbors and citizens groups on the one hand, and landowners desirous of making beneficial
utilization of their parcels and wireless service providers on the other.290 The charge that the
Siting Policy “is vague in its reach and implications and serves as the source for political,
economic, and emotional turmoil for the wireless industry and communities alike”291 does seem

287

See, e.g., Michael M. Berger & Gideon Kanner, The Need for Takings Law Reform: A View from
the Trenches–A Response to Taking Stock of the Takings Debate, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 837, 874-75
(1998); Gregory Overstreet, The Ripeness Doctrine of the Taking Clause: A Survey of Decisions Showing
Just How Far the Federal Courts Will Go to Avoid Adjudicating Land Use Cases, 10 J. LAND USE &
ENVTL. L. 91 (1994); Brian W. Blaesser, Closing the Federal Courthouse Door on Property Owners: The
Ripeness and Abstention Doctrines in Section 1983 Land Use Cases, 2 HOFSTRA PROP. L.J. 73 (1988).
288

See, e.g., John J. Delaney & Duane J. Desiderio, Who Will Clean Up the “Ripeness Mess”?: A Call
for Reform So Takings Plaintiffs Can Enter the Federal Courthouse, 31 URB. LAW. 195 (1999) (arguing
that Congress should pass legislation easing the rules for jurisdiction of takings claims); Daniel R.
Mandelker & Michael M. Berger, A Plea to Allow the Federal Courts to Clarify the Law of Regulatory
Takings, 42 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG. 3 (1990) (arguing federal takings questions should be resolved
in federal courts).
289

Testimony of Daniel R. Mandelker Before the House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on
Courts and Intellectual Property, on H.R. 1534 (1998).
290

Id.

291

David W. Hughes, When NIMBYs Attack: The Heights to Which Communities Will Climb to
Pre vent the Siting of Wireless Towers, 23 J. CORP. L. 469, 474 (1998).
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to be a “universal conclusion.”292 These results flow from Section 404’s rhetorical attempt to
have it both ways–to bridge the gap between NIMBY concerns and telecommunications
infrastructure expansion with legislation that would have local rules and practices regulated by
federal procedural devices.
VI. BALANCING THE EQUITIES: NEW PRESUMPTIONS AND SAFE HARBOR RULES
A. The Need for Legislative Reform
In large cities, there are substantial tall structures upon or in which wireless
communications antennae could be constructed. The local political landscape is varied as well,
with the local legislature comprised of members who represent the interests of varied
manufacturing, commercial, residential, and socioeconomic constituencies. In typical suburbs, on
the other hand, the landscape is flatter, and the voting constituency consists almost entirely of
homeowners who perceive that their property values would be adversely affected by cellular
communications towers. Whether correct or not from any other perspective, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit’s observation about local legislators rings true as a political
statement: “[A] legislature and its members will consider the views of their constituents to be
particularly compelling forms of evidence, in zoning as in all other legislative matters. These
views, if widely shared, will often trump those of bureaucrats or experts in the minds of
reasonable legislators.”293
It is realistic to assume that NIMBY pressures will continue, and that it will retard the
development of wireless communications services to a certain extent. There does not appear to
be the political will, nor would it necessarily be advantageous, to have a comprehensively strict
and preemptive federal statute regulating the development of wireless communications facilities.

292

Andrew B. Levy, Note, If Not Here, Where?: Wireless Facility Siting and Section 332(c)(7) of the
Telecommunications Act, 8 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 389, 392 -393 (1999) (quoting Hughes, op. cit.).
293

AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City Council of Virginia Beach, 155 F.3d 423, 430 (4th Cir. 1998).

Draft of 9/3/2004

Please do not cite or quote without permission.

Eagle, Wireless Telecommunications, Infrastructure Security, and the NIMBY Problem

55

The failure to enact the House version of the facility siting provisions into law cannot be
undone.294
Two vehicles seem most promising for furthering the growth of wireless
telecommunications while protecting the interest of neighborhood residents. First, industry
officials should strive for collocation of facilities and aesthetic design where practical. Local
political leaders should realize that the interests of their constituents largely are aligned with
broader goals of national commercial development and security. It is true, as an industry attorney
put it, that “both parties working together can solve many siting problems.”295 “Short of
extremely unpopular legislation pre-empting local moratoria against tower siting, only a
cooperative effort by all parties will ensure that all interests are protected.”296 The American
Planning Association, among other groups, has done extensive work to try to locate such
solutions.297
On the other hand, however, the siting provisions of the TCA are too vague, confusing,
and weak to be of much assistance.298 The challenge is to devise amendments to the TCA that
stop short of general preemption of local land use regulation of wireless towers, but beyond
federal controls that are procedural and that attempt to fasten themselves to the adaptable
rulemaking of sometimes recalcitrant local legislators.
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B. Suggestions for Statutory Reform of the TCA Siting Provisions
1. Burden Shifting
As described earlier,299 federal courts have been split on whether the burden of proof with
respect to the TCA’s limitations on local regulatory authority300 falls upon the applicant or the
municipality. A rule of statutory interpretation is to define exceptions to the general rule
narrowly.301 While one might perceive the “limitations” provision of 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B) to
be the exception to the “preservation of local authority” provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7), it is
also true that the “preservation of local authority” itself is carved out from the more general
provisions of the Communications Act.302 That provision gives plenary authority to the FCC to
regulate wireless communications.303 In other words, being the exception to the exception, the
Siting Policy limitations on local authority reflect the general rule.
From a political and a practical perspective, Congress approached the question of
statutory siting provisions not as one of subordinating one set of values to another, but rather one
of harmonizing two conflicting sets of societal values. One, encapsulated in the Commerce
Clause,304 and in the authority of Congress to provide for homeland security,305 encourages
wireless infrastructure development. The other, encapsulated in the concept of the federal
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government being one of enumerated powers and in the Tenth Amendment,306 respects local
autonomy.
Given that state and local governments have wide latitude in fashioning the substantive
rules of land use regulation as they pertain to wireless communications towers, they should have
the corresponding burden of demonstrating that their decisions are properly predicated on those
rules. This proposition essentially is no different from that approved by the U.S. Supreme Court
in City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd.,307 where the Court approved of the
use of jury determinations of whether “the city’s particular decision to deny Del Monte Dunes’
final development proposal was reasonably related to the city’s proffered justifications.”308
1. Limitations on Time for Action on Permit Applications
The Siting Policy provides that state and local governments must act upon wireless
facilities siting permit applications within “a reasonable period of time”309 The Supreme Court
was reluctant to draw rigid lines for the duration of development moratoria for Takings Clause
purposes in its recent decision in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency.310 However, the Court noted that a number of states have specific time limits for interim
zoning ordinances ranging from six months to two years.311 Furthermore, the Court noted that
“[i]t may well be true that any moratorium that lasts for more than one year should be viewed
with special skepticism.”312
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The fact that some states already have statutory limitations pertaining to delays in issuing
land use determinations, strongly implies that flat durational requirements are consistent with the
exercise of valid local police powers. Long delays in making determinations not only earn
skepticism as to underlying motives with respect to the individual applications, but also lend
doubt as to whether delays that ostensibly are for review of applications in fact are for
discrimination among providers or prohibitions on wireless service, both of which Section 704
already prohibits.313
Should Congress not want to impose absolute durational limitations on local review on
the grounds that this would deprive municipalities of the ability to deal with unusual situations, it
could temper the requirement by providing for an exception in the case of extraordinary
circumstances, which the locality would have to justify under a “strong and convincing
evidence” standard.314
As discussed earlier,315 the total incorporation of the Takings Clause Williamson County
doctrine316 into the TCA’s requirement that local land use regulators reach decisions within a
“reasonable period of time after the request is duly filed”317 seems extravagant given the need to
balance against local autonomy the national goals of facilitating commerce and homeland
security. The requirement that courts hear Siting Policy permit denial cases “on an expedited
basis” attests to Congressional concern about undue delay.318 The effect of Williamson County is
to facilitate delay by transposing its context from the consideration of the permit application by
local regulators to whether the permit application is “meaningful” so as to be duly filed.
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A good solution to this problem might be the incorporation within the TCA siting
provisions of the substance of Florida’s innovative “Bert J. Harris, Jr., Private Property Rights
Protection Act.”319 Under that statute, government agencies are required to issue a written
“ripeness decision identifying the allowable uses to which the subject property may be put.”320 In
effect, the Bert J. Harris Act requires a locality to provide the information that the Supreme
Court assumed that Williamson County would result in the landowner being supplied–”a final
decision regarding how it will be allowed to develop its property.”321
The TCA could be amended to require not only that a landowner or wireless service
provider receive a decision on a siting application within a specified time, but that, at the
applicant’s election, a denial would have to be accompanied by a statement enumerating the
wireless facilities uses, if any, to which the property may be put. This would permit the applicant
to file suit in a time frame consistent with Congress’s existing mandate for judicial review “on an
expedited basis.”322 It also would satisfy the Supreme Court’s concerns in Williamson County
that a court act with full knowledge of the facts.
C. Safe Harbor Rules and Presumptions
Another approach towards amending the Siting Policy to achieve more balance is the
increased use of statutory safe harbor rules. The existing provision ensuring that applicants can
meet any legitimate state or local radio frequency emissions concern by complying with FCC
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emissions standards,323 is an example. Similar statutory rules could be put in place with respect
to facilities to be located within existing structures or structures that primarily serve other
functions.
Statutory presumptions could be enacted favoring towers and other wireless facilities
located in areas zoned for industrial or commercial use, or along four- or six-lane or interstate
highways. In areas zoned residential, presumptions might be keyed to such objective measures as
ratios of tower height to the height of nearby structures, or the distance between the tower and
the property line. If a permit application meets these statutory requirements, it could be
overcome only through clear and convincing evidence.
1. Other Statutory Changes
Another approach is modification of the TCA to provide wireless communications
service providers treatment equal of that of existing public utilities. As an illustration, in New
York the very stringent requirements otherwise applicable for landowners seeking a use
variance324 are subject to a “public utility” exception.325 In Cellular Telephone Co. v.
Rosenberg,326 the New York Court of Appeals held that “a cellular telephone company is a
‘public utility’ . . . . [and that] the construction of an antenna tower in a residential district to
facilitate the supply of cellular telephone service is a ‘public utility building’ within the meaning
of a zoning ordinance.”327
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While the political imperatives might militate against such an approach, the TCA could
be amended to as to preempt wireless communications facilities from local land use regulation,
which leaving state regulation substantially undisturbed. Already, a state’s own immunity from
local zoning laws may be shared with private firms licensed to construct communications towers
on state land for use by wireless telecommunications providers.328 State regulation of wireless
towers would alleviate concerns about distant and obtrusive federal intervention, while at the
same time reducing the jockeying that might occur among adjoining communities, each seeking
to have the other provide service to a multi-jurisdictional area from its side of the boundary line.
Another modification to the TCA that would put wireless communications service
providers on the same footing as other utilities is to require that they be treated as favorably as
fiber optic cable lines or other physical utility lines run along public rights of way. Although the
use of government-owned land for wireless towers is somewhat different than the use of such of
such areas for physical utility lines, electrical transmissions towers and above-ground amplifying
or pumping stations suggest formulae for the equalization of access charges.
VII. CONCLUSION
In a thoughtful coda to one of its TCA facility siting decisions, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the First Circuitobserved :
The statute’s balance of local autonomy subject to federal limitations does not offer a
single “cookie cutter” solution for diverse local situations, and it imposes an unusual
burden on the courts. But Congress conceived that this course would produce (albeit at
some cost and delay for the carriers) individual solutions best adapted to the needs and
desires of particular communities. If this refreshing experiment in federalism does not
work, Congress can always alter the law.329

The FCC noted in 2003 that “the increasing presence of cable and wireless-based
telephone services as well as the advent of broadband services and other new

328

Crown Communication New York v. Dept. of Transp., 765 N.Y.S.2d 898, 901 (App. Div. 2003)
(noting that “the shared use of the towers is integral to the State plan of improving its own
telecommunications infrastructure and furthers the State’s goal of reducing the proliferation of towers”).
329

Town of Amherst v. Omnipoint Communications Enters., Inc., 173 F.3d 9, 17 (1st Cir. 1999).

Draft of 9/3/2004

Please do not cite or quote without permission.

Eagle, Wireless Telecommunications, Infrastructure Security, and the NIMBY Problem

62

telecommunications and information services has already worked changes in the industry to a far
greater extent than could have been reasonably predicted in 1996.”330
While the wireless facility siting rules of the TCA have worked to a limited extent, their
leitmotif of substantially deferential federal procedural checks engrafted upon state procedure,
state substantive law, local ordinances, and most unrestrained local interpretation of those
ordinances is not satisfactory. Similarly, the original House version of the facilities siting
provisions, which imposed federal preemption, were unsatisfactory. The TCA should be
amended along the lines suggested in this article so as to achieve a better balance between
commerce and homeland security and local autonomy.
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